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Governments should embrace randomized trials to estimate the efficacy of different 
laws and regulations. Just as random assignment of treatments is the most powerful 
method of testing for the causal impact of pharmaceuticals, randomly assigning 
individuals or firms to different legal rules can help resolve uncertainty about the 
consequential impacts of law. We explain why randomized testing is likely to produce 
better information than nonrandom evaluation of legal policies and offer guidelines 
for conducting legal experimentation successfully, considering a variety of obstacles, 
including ethical ones. Randomization will not be useful for all policies, but once 
government gains better experience with randomization, administrative agencies 
should presumptively issue randomization impact statements justifying decisions to 
implement particular policies. Making the content of law partially contingent on the 
results of randomized trials will promote ex ante bipartisan agreements, as 
politicians with different empirical predictions will tend to think that the experiments 
will support their position.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Debates about the causal impacts of government policy are omnipresent. In 81 B.C., 
Chinese scholars debated the desirability of monopolies in the salt and iron industries in a 
succession of essays and public debates.1 These debates were theoretical—with scholars 
predicting the positive and negative effects of monopolies versus a competitive market. Over two 
thousand years later, theoretical debates over policies remain the norm. But many policy issues 
cannot be resolved by theory alone, because different theories point in different directions. 
Scholars attempt to inform these debates by parsing historical data, but regression analysis of 
policy is fraught with complications. There is little policy variation on many topics of national 
importance, and the variation that does exist is correlated with many other factors. Empirical 
policy evaluation often resembles a drug study where the experimental population gets to choose 
whether to take the medicine or the placebo. 
Policymakers and commentators frequently refer loosely to new laws and legal 
institutions as “experiments,”2 but in contrast to medical experimentation,3 these innovations 
rarely randomly designate treatment and control groups. There have been a handful of exceptions 
since 1968,4 randomized “social experiments” on the impact of government policies. But the 
legal literature has virtually ignored them. Legal scholars have discussed the results of particular 
social experiments,5 and occasionally have commented that additional social experiments could 
                                                 
1 The Scholar as Government Consultant: The Great Salt and Iron Debate in Ancient China, 7 AM. BEHAV. SCI. (1965), 
available at http://www.grazian-archive.com/archive/pdf/1965_06_00_ABS_salt_and_iron_debate_1_10.pdf. 
2 See, e.g., Orit Fischman Afori, Reconceptualizing Property in Designs, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1105, 1151 (2008) 
(referring to a statute providing intellectual property protection for vessel hulls as a “legal experiment”); Theodor Meron, 
Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 551, 551 (2006) (referring to the 
Nurenberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals as “a bold legal experiment”); Alan Milner, Restatement: The Failure of a Legal 
Experiment, 20 U. PITT. L. REV. 795 (1959) (characterizing restatements of law as a failed experiment). The most prominent 
academic account of experimental approaches to government also defines experimentation broadly, mentioning randomization as 
a possible ingredient of experimentation only once. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 348 (1998) (noting that systems for evaluating experiments “can themselves be 
benchmarked, and . . . can be combined with random-assignment experiments and other familiar methods of evaluation”). 
3 For a historical discussion of the introduction of randomization into statistical analysis in medicine, see Tar Timothy Chan, 
History of Statistical Thinking in Medicine, in ADVANCED MEDICAL STATISTICS 3, 11-14 (Ying Lu & Ji-Qian Fang eds., 2003). 
See also Ronald A. Fisher, The Arrangement of Field Experiments, 33 J. MIN. AGRIC. GREAT BRITAIN 503 (1926) (introducing the 
idea of the random trial). 
4 A doctoral student, Heather Ross, developed the idea for the experiment, on the effect of a negative income tax, and then 
received governmental funding. The experimental results are reported in three volumes. See 1-3 THE NEW JERSEY INCOME 
MAINTENANCE EXPERIMENT (Harold W. Watts et al., 1976-1977). Useful summaries of the experiment are in SOCIAL 
EXPERIMENTATION 95-143 (Jerry A. Hausman & David A. Wise eds., 1985); and DAVID GREENBERG ET AL., SOCIAL 
EXPERIMENTATION AND PUBLIC POLICYMAKING 111-64 (2003). 
5 See, e.g., Machaela M. Hoctor, Comment, Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the State: The Need for Mandatory Arrest in 
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provide useful information in one field or another.6 But they have not addressed the normative 
question of whether the legal system should generally seek to incorporate experimental methods, 
and if so, what approaches the legal system should take to maximize the chance that experiments 
will improve policy.  
Perhaps in part as a result of this scholarly neglect, past social experiments have clustered 
in specific policy areas. As the label “social experimentation” suggests, most of the experiments 
have been in the area of social services, testing whether expenditures on entitlements succeed in 
achieving social goals such as reducing poverty.7 For example, a recent experiment, executed 
under a Medicare statute requiring randomized testing of programs,8 assessed whether telephone 
contact by nurses to at-risk Medicare patients will reduce program costs.9 Another class of 
randomized studies test criminal justice policies.10 A rare exception outside these two areas was a 
set of experiments on electricity pricing.11 Experiments almost never vary legal rights and 
obligations of ordinary citizens and entities in areas such as securities law or taxation.12 Instead, 
they focus on possible provision of new services or on those who might be thought of as 
forfeiting rights by committing crimes.  
This Article advances the case for randomizing law, including the legal rights and 
obligations expressed in statutes and regulation.13 Randomized experiments have the potential 
                                                                                                                                                             
California, 85 CAL. L. REV. 643, 655-57 (1997) (commenting on a Minneapolis experiment with randomized mandatory arrest of 
alleged domestic violence perpetrators). 
6 See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment: On the Limits of Reason and the Virtues of 
Randomization, 74 SOC. RES. 307, 328-30 (2007) (proposing randomization in criminal justice, for example in setting the length 
of prison sentences); Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field Experiments, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67 (proposing randomized experiments on procedural rules). 
7 “[M]ost social experiment test programs are targeted at persons or families who are somehow disadvantaged, particularly in 
terms of having low incomes.” GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 26. 
8 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 721 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395b-8) (requiring “development, testing, and evaluation of chronic care improvement programs using randomized controlled 
trials”). 
9 See NANCY MCCALL ET AL., CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, EVALUATION OF PHASE 1 OF MEDICARE HEALTH 
SUPPORT (FORMERLY VOLUNTARY CHRONIC CARE IMPROVEMENT) PILOT PROGRAM UNDER TRADITIONAL FEE-FOR-SERVICE 
MEDICARE (June 2007); Reed Abelson, Medicare Finds How Hard It Is To Save Money, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2008, at A1 
(describing the program). 
10 See generally David F. Farrington & Brandon C. Welsh, A Half Century of Randomized Experiments on Crime and Justice, 34 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 55 (2006) (providing an overview of randomized criminal justice experiments, the first of which was initiated 
in 1951 and reported on in 1978).  
11 See SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 4, at 11-53; see also RESEARCH TRIANGLE INST., ANALYTICAL MASTER PLAN FOR 
THE ANALYSIS OF THE DATA FROM THE ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS (1978). 
12 For an exception that we propose to extend, see Part V.C.1.a. 
13 The possibility that judge-made legal rules could be subjected to randomized testing is beyond the scope of this Article.  Such 
testing could be implemented by legislatures to the extent that statutes can preempt common-law rulemaking.  But more 
RANDOMIZING LAW 
 
5 
not merely to be governmentally funded academic exercises, but to serve as integral components 
of the legal process. In this Article, we argue that government should embrace randomized trials 
of statutes and regulations as a tool for testing what works. Just as random assignment of 
treatments is the most powerful method of testing for the causal impact of pharmaceuticals, 
randomly assigning individuals, firms, or jurisdictions to different legal rules can help resolve 
uncertainty about the consequences of laws and regulations. 
Beyond endorsing randomized legal experimentation even in areas where such 
experiments have not generally been contemplated, this Article considers how the policy process 
should change to accommodate randomized experimentation. Administrative law, we argue, 
should accept decisions by agencies to randomize policies and perhaps even be more deferential 
to policy decisions arrived at after a process of experimentation. Ultimately, the executive branch 
could make formalized consideration of randomized control trials as central a part of the 
regulatory process as formalized consideration of the costs and benefits of regulations. If 
experimentation begins to occur sufficiently often in agencies, perhaps Congress or other 
legislatures might themselves initiate experiments more frequently. The possibility of 
experimentation may reduce legislative disagreement. Where disagreements are truly empirical, 
partisans on both sides of an issue may believe that they would benefit from experimentation. In 
a self-executing experiment, an experiment can in effect serve to resolve a bet among competing 
legislative factions, with the experiment outcome automatically affecting the content of the 
legislation. Meanwhile, if a legal culture of randomization developed sufficiently, a legislator’s 
refusal to endorse an experiment might be interpreted as evidence that the legislator’s empirical 
claims about a policy mask some other agenda. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II lays out the affirmative case for randomized 
control trials and describes our central proposal.  Part III describes the problems of nonrandom 
evaluation of legal policies. Conventional regression analysis is subject to problems including 
omitted variable bias, publication bias, and misspecification. Part IV discusses potential 
problems and pitfalls of randomized policy experiments, as well as responses to these 
complications. Some of these problems involve challenges of interpreting even randomized legal 
experiments, though in general randomization should make interpretation somewhat easier. More 
                                                                                                                                                             
speculatively one might imagine courts themselves conducting prospective randomized control experiments to gather evidence on 
the most appropriate resolution in a case. 
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challenging problems from the perspective of policy implementation are that randomized legal 
policy may be costly or raise ethical concerns. Finally, Part V offers some guidelines for legal 
experimentation, including specific recommendations for legislatures and administrative 
agencies, and then describes some specific applications in which randomization seems especially 
likely to be fruitful. 
II. THE POWER OF RANDOMIZED CONTROLS 
The idea that randomization could be used to create a quality control group has existed 
since 1925, when Ronald Fisher, the father of modern statistics, suggested using random 
assignments in agricultural trials in research growing out of his work at the Rothamsted 
Experimental Station.14   In his 1935 book, The Design of Experiments,15 Fisher explained the 
power of the technique with the arresting example of a “lady [who] declares that by tasting a cup 
of tea made with milk she can discriminate whether the milk or the tea infusion was first added 
to the cup.”16  Fisher proposed mixing eight cups of tea—four with milk first and four with milk 
last—and “presenting them to the subject for judgment in random order.”17   
Intentionally interjecting uncertainty into the experimental design could have the perverse 
effect of enhancing the ability of a researcher to control the experiment.  As David Harrington 
has noted: 
In one of the delightful ironies of modern science, the randomized trial “adjusts” for 
both observed and unobserved heterogeneity in a controlled experiment by 
introducing chance variation into the study design. If interventions for patients are 
chosen by chance, then the law of large numbers implies that the average values of 
patient characteristics should be roughly equal in the intervention groups.18 
In the term “randomized control trial,” it is the randomization itself that is producing the 
controlled environment of a similar comparison group.  Of course randomization doesn’t mean 
that the control and treatment groups will be identical.  If we looked at the heights of people in 
each group, we would see the standard bell curve.  But the point is that we would see the same 
                                                 
14 RONALD A. FISHER, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RESEARCH WORKERS (1925); see also IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY 
THINKING-BY-NUMBERS IS THE NEW WAY TO BE SMART 46-80 (2007) (discussing power of randomization tool for business and 
NGOs). 
15 RONALD A. FISHER, THE DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS (1935). 
16 RONALD A. FISHER, THE DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 11 (6th ed. 1951). 
17 Id. 
18 David P. Harrington, The Randomized Clinical Trial, 95 J. AM. STAT. ASSOC. 312 (2000). 
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bell curve of heights in both groups.  The law of large numbers assures that in the limit the mean 
of both groups will both converge on the population mean.  But random assignment means that 
beyond the mean, the distribution of both groups with regard to every characteristic (save the 
treatment itself) will become increasingly identical as the sample size increases.  Instead of 
trying to establish identical control pairs—which on a pair-wise basis are identical on every non-
treatment dimension—random assignment creates groups that have statistically similar 
distributions on every non-treatment dimension.  Since the distribution of height (or any other 
characteristic) is the same in both the control and the treatment groups, we can attribute any 
differences in the average group response to the difference in treatment. 
Indeed Fisher’s breakthrough was in seeing that randomization could do a better job of 
producing a controlled experiment than would be possible with non-randomized controls.  Fisher 
went so far as to argue that randomization produced better controls than could ever be achieved 
by physically matching the non-tested attributes.  In discussing his “Lady and the Tea” problem, 
Fisher explained: 
It is no sufficient remedy to insist that “all cups must be exactly alike” in every 
respect except that to be tested.  For this is a totally impossible requirement, in our 
example, and equally in all other forms of experimentation.  In practice it is possible 
that the cups will differ perceptibly in the thickness or smoothness of their material, 
that the quantities of milk added to the different cups will not be exactly equal, that 
the strength of the infusion of tea may change between pouring the first and the last 
cup, and that the temperature also at which the tea is tasted will change during the 
course of the experiment.19   
For Fisher, some attributes of an experiment were beyond a researcher’s ability to physically 
control by experimental design.  Some causal attributes, for example, may not be observable.  
But randomization as a control assures that sufficiently large control and treatment groups will 
be similar even on attributes that are unobservable to the researcher.  
The first formal randomized drug trial on humans took place in the late 1940s, when 
Austin Bradford Hill ran the first clinical trial testing the effectiveness of streptomycin in treating 
tuberculosis.20  By 1962, the use of random controlled trials had become so prevalent that 
Congress amended the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to mandate the use of “adequate and well-
                                                 
19 FISHER, supra note 16, at 18 (emphasis added). 
20 Medical Research Council, Streptomycin in Tuberculosis Trials Committee: Streptomycin Treatment of Pulmonary 
Tuberculosis, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 769 (1948). 
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controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific 
training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved.”21  Since 1970, 
randomized clinical trials have been a critical part of FDA analysis of applications.22 
Given the considerable benefits of randomized policy experiments, we propose that 
government systematize and expand experimentation. Before enacting legislation, legislators 
should consider conducting an experiment of the new policy. Administrators should also adopt 
widespread experimentation. Just as Cost Benefit Analyses and Environmental Impact 
Statements are necessary steps in the formation of numerous regulations and policies,23 so too 
should “randomization impact statements” (RIS) become part of the policy planning landscape.  
Randomized studies should not be an absolute prerequisite for legal change, but a norm to 
randomize or explain why randomization could not be undertaken would help discipline 
regulators to take evidence-based lawmaking more seriously.  Whenever a new regulation is put 
forward, the relevant agency should be presumptively required to present an RIS with the 
contents described in this Section.  We discuss later the details of implementation (including 
when agency can proceed to regulate without an RIS).24  The new norm, however, should be the 
presentation of data from a randomized policy experiment.  
 
                                                 
21 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(1) (2000); see also Karen Baswell, Note, Time for a Change: Why the FDA Should Require 
Greater Disclosure of Differences of Opinion on the Safety and Efficacy of Approved Drugs, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1799 (2007). 
22 21 C.F.R. § 314.50.  See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 
445F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription 
Drugs and Medical Devices: Perspectives on Private Certification and Tor Reform, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 883 
(1996); see also 40 C.F.R. § 799.9420 (EPA regulation mandating randomized testing of toxic substances).  
23 The National Environmental Policy Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-21 (2000), requires an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) for 
“any  major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” The purpose of the EIS is to to improve 
agency decisionmaking by requiring “detailed information concerning significant environmental impact.” Robertson v. Methow 
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989). Executive Order Number 12,866 states that “[i]n deciding whether and how 
to regulate, agencies should assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not 
regulating.” Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). The objectives of this Executive Order are to enhance 
planning and coordination with respect to both new and existing regulations; to reaffirm the primacy of federal agencies in the 
regulatory decisionmaking process; to restore the integrity and legitimacy of regulatory review and oversight; and to make the 
process more accessible and open to the public.   
24 See infra Part V.B.2. 
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III. THE PROBLEMS OF NONRANDOM EVALUATION 
This Part explores the advantages of randomized studies by reviewing recurring 
weaknesses in alternative modes of evaluation. This analysis responds to the argument that 
randomized studies are unnecessary, because statistical and econometric techniques can be used 
to estimate policy effects reliably. Even when the most advanced techniques are employed, 
nonrandom analyses will generally leave more uncertainty than random analyses. Any statutory 
change is experimental in that it creates a new legal regime, allowing comparison to the world in 
the prior regime. Indeed, it is common for proponents and neutral commentators to describe such 
a change as “an experiment.”25 Effects, however, can be difficult to assess, because there may be 
alternative explanations for any observed changes. Some legal changes are sufficiently drastic, 
and the responses to them sufficiently immediate and profound, that some changes may be 
attributed to them. But reasonable observers often disagree about causality. And even if 
reasonable sophisticated parties would agree, partisans may offer misleading interpretations of 
the data. The media may then summarize the debate by simply noting that experts disagree.26 
Those who do not have the time, inclination, or ability to probe the evidence cannot then easily 
discern the truth.27  
As the number of jurisdictions trying an experiment rises, the data may become clearer. 
But even then, the challenges of statistical analysis may make it difficult to reach confident 
conclusions. Statistical associations between jurisdictions adopting policies and other variables 
need not imply causation. It will thus almost always be relatively easy for partisans to find some 
basis on which either to develop misleading results or to offer critiques of results that in fact are 
relatively robust. Part III explains why even with numerous jurisdictions, conventional multiple 
regression analysis in which the policy of interest forms an independent variable may produce 
inaccurate results. These sections, of course, are not intended to provide comprehensive 
overviews of the uses and limits of statistical analysis.28 Part III.C comments on the difficulties 
of improving the law by using the states as policy laboratories without randomization. 
                                                 
25 See supra note 2. 
26 See Bryan Keefer, Tsunami, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July 1, 2004, at 18 (discussing reporters’ reluctance to take sides on 
issues of public controversy). 
27 A similar problem exists when jurors try to assess evidence beyond their competence. See Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert 
Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535 (1998). 
28 A useful overview of regression analysis is WILLIAM MENDENHALL & TERRY L. SINCICH, A SECOND COURSE IN STATISTICS: 
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A. Conventional Regression Analysis 
1. Omitted Variable Bias 
Correlation, introductory statistics students are told, does not imply causation. The 
simplest example of this is the possibility of reverse causation. For example, suppose that 
students who receive sex education have sex at an earlier age.29 This could mean that sex 
education encourages students to have more sex, but it also could reflect that school districts with 
high rates of student sexual activity respond to these rates by offering sex education. A standard 
statistical approach to overcoming this problem is to add control variables for the characteristics 
of the students, such as family income, parents’ education, and religion, as well as of the 
community, such as whether it is rural and in which region of the country it is located.30 If those 
variables exhaust all nonrandom factors contributing to community and family decisions about 
sex education, then this technique will be successful, because the coefficient on the sex education 
variable then represents the effect of random variation in whether students are exposed to sex 
education. But if there is an omitted variable, correlated with both the community decision to 
offer sex education and the individual decision to have sex, the coefficient will be biased. 
This problem cannot easily be avoided even by careful researchers (and can be exploited 
by researchers who hope to establish a particular result). There are at least two reasons for this. 
First, the available data may be incomplete. Even if there are strong theoretical reasons to believe 
that parental education is an important variable, it may be impossible to develop a measure that 
fully accounts for the parent’s educational level.31 For example, a measure indicating whether 
someone’s mother graduated from high school would seem to imply that all high school dropouts 
are alike and all high school graduates are alike, but within each group, there may be 
considerable educational heterogeneity. Even more precise data—including information like 
parental GPAs—will be at best only crude proxies. Second, the researchers’ theoretical accounts 
of what variables may correlate with the dependent and independent variables are likely to be 
incomplete.  
                                                                                                                                                             
REGRESSION ANALYSIS (6th ed. 2003). For a critical analysis of the use of empirical evidence in legal scholarship, see Lee 
Epstein, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
29 See, e.g., Deborah Anne Dawson, The Effects of Sex Education on Adolescent Behavior, 18 FAMILY PLANNING PERSP. 162 
(July/August 1986)  
30 See, e.g., id. at 170 tbl. 9 (listing control variables). 
31 Dawson’s study used a binary variable indicating whether the mother had at least twelve years of education. See id. at 166. 
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The omitted variable bias may be particularly problematic when regressions are used to 
analyze the behavior of individuals who have self-selected into particular governmental 
programs. For example, Julie Cullen et al. analyzed the effect of school choice lotteries, whose 
winners would be allowed to attend particular schools.32 Students who won the school choice 
lotteries tended to do better than students who did not enter the lotteries. Competing explanations 
include that lottery winners were allowed to attend better schools and that more motivated 
students are likely to self-select into the lottery. In the absence of variables fully capturing 
student motivation, a regression would tend to inflate the apparent effects of the schools on 
performance. Indeed, Cullen et al. showed that students who won the school choice lotteries 
performed no better than students who entered but lost the same lotteries. So it was student 
motivation, and not school quality, that caused the difference in performance between school 
lottery winners and non-lottery entrants. Though not created for the purpose of facilitating data 
analysis, the lottery produced random assignments that allowed the researchers to avoid omitted 
variable bias. 
Even studies that attempt to control for all available information and seek to minimize the 
danger of omitted variable bias may nonetheless omit important variables. This can be shown by 
comparing the results of randomized experiments from the results of nonrandomized statistical 
analysis. Paul Glewwe et al. conducted separate prospective randomized and retrospective 
nonrandomized studies of whether making “flip charts” available to students in Kenya increased 
test scores. The retrospective studies showed that flip charts increased test scores, while the 
randomized studies revealed no effect.33 Even a difference-in-difference analysis gave 
misleading results, showing that students in schools adopting flip charts performed especially 
well in flip chart subjects relative to other subjects. The forces that lead jurisdictions or 
institutions to adopt policy changes such as flip charts may be so complex that omitted variables 
matter even when it is not obvious that any important variables are omitted. 
Some statistical techniques, such as instrumental variable and regression discontinuity 
studies, seek to take advantage of naturally occurring randomness. A full discussion of these 
                                                 
32 See, e.g., Julie Berry Cullen et al., The Effect of School Choice on Student Outcomes: Evidence from Randomized Lotteries 
(NBER Working Paper No. 10113, 2003). 
33 Paul Glewwe et al., Retrospective vs. Prospective Analyses of School Inputs: The Case of Flip Charts in Kenya (NBER 
Working Paper No. 8018, 2000). 
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techniques is beyond our scope here, but these approaches will still often be inferior to 
randomized control trials. With instrumental variables studies, there may be some subjectivity in 
the choice of instruments. Although there are statistical tests that can be used to assess the 
validity of instruments,34 one can still argue about whether specific instruments are the best 
available. Meanwhile, with regression discontinuity studies, there may be some subjectivity in 
assessing whether groups on either side of a discontinuity are truly comparable. Casual 
empiricism, in any event, suggests that such studies require sufficient analytical judgment that 
their improved statistical power may not translate to a greater likelihood that the findings will be 
accepted in the public policy process. For example, a paper by Saurabh Bhargava and Vikram 
Pathania takes advantage of the discontinuity in cellular telephone rates around 9 p.m.35 Call 
volumes today increase discontinuously around the 9 p.m. threshold, but there has been no 
increase in accidents immediately after 9 p.m. relative to the period before cell companies began 
to offer free calling after 9 p.m. Nonetheless, policymakers have continued to proclaim cell 
phone driving as dangerous as driving under the influence of alcohol.36 Instrumental variables 
and regression discontinuity studies do not necessarily have greater impact on the policy process 
than other studies, even for the issues for which they are feasible. 
2. Publication Bias and Misspecification 
Statistically significant results can also be spurious as a result of publication bias. A 
finding of a statistically significant outcome, at the generally accepted 0.05 level, means that 
there is a five percent chance that an outcome at least as extreme would have occurred by pure 
chance if the null hypothesis were true.37 If, for example, researchers test 100 propositions that in 
fact are all false and would be counterintuitive if true, about five of these tests may produce 
                                                 
34 See Jerry A. Hausman, Specification Tests in Econometrics, 46 ECONOMETRICA 1251 (1978). 
35 Saurabh Bhargava & Vikram Pathania, Driving Under the (Cellular) Influence: The Link Between Cell Phone Use and 
Vehicle Crashes (AEI Working Paper No. 07-15, July 2007), at http://aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-
safely.php?fname=../pdffiles/WP07-15_topost.pdf. 
36 See, e.g., Mike Stuckey, Hands-Free Phones Are Lifesavers, Study Says, MSNBC, May 13, 2008, at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24580099/ (quoting a California legislator who embraced a recent study on cell phones while 
apparently paying no heed to the Bhargava and Pathania study). 
37 An example of a “null hypothesis” would be that in the true relationship being estimated by a regression equation, the 
coefficient for one of the independent variables in fact is zero, indicating that, after controlling for other variables, there is no 
relationship between the dependent variable and that independent variable. 
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statistically significant results, and these mistaken results will be the most publishable.38 
Meanwhile, insignificant findings provide little support for the truth of the corresponding null 
hypotheses. Such findings also may be most publishable when they are counterintuitive, but a 
counterintuitive failure to reject a null hypothesis may also be the result of chance.39 
Publication bias applies not only across studies, but also within studies. Researchers face 
many choices about how to specify regression equations: what functional form to use,40 which 
variables to include, what transformations to apply to the variables,41 and which observations to 
include.42 Especially within social science, researchers do not necessarily settle on regression 
specifications in advance, but instead “pretest” data to determine which results to report.43 
Considering a large number of regression specifications may help researchers develop nuanced 
accounts, but researchers will generally be more likely to report results producing statistical 
significance.44 Laboratory experiments are also subject to publication bias, but other researchers 
can attempt replication. Social science researchers cannot rerun history.45 
Social scientists can, however, seek to assess the robustness of published results, but 
often there will be some subjectivity involved in determining whether a study’s results are 
sufficiently robust to justify causal inferences.. A recent example was John Donohue and Justin 
Wolfers’ scrutiny of studies purporting to show deterrent effects of the death penalty.46 For 
                                                 
38 Some researchers have sought to counter this by encouraging the publication of statistically insignificant results. See, e.g., 
Huai Yong Cheng, The Potential Value of Negative Studies, 6 J. AM. MED. DIRECTORS ASS’N 426 (2005). 
39 See J. Bradford De Long & Kevin Lang, Are All Economic Hypotheses False?, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1257 (1992) (conducting a 
statistical analysis of the distribution of statistical results to estimate the proportion of unrejected null nypotheses that are false). 
The De Long and Lang statistical analysis rejects “the null hypothesis that more than about one-third of unrejected null 
hypotheses … are true.” Id. at 1258. That is, among published findings that do not show statistically significant outcomes  
40 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 316-50 (3d ed. 1998) (providing an introduction to these issues). 
41 See id. (considering the possibility of nonlinear specifications). 
42 There may be flexibility both in determining the general coverage of the study (for example, what years or states to study), as 
well as in identifying outliers. Typically, when an observation is identified as an outlier, a researcher will run a regression both 
with and without the outliers to determine whether the results are robust. There are also econometric techniques designed to 
produce estimates not overly susceptible to outliers. See, e.g., PETER J. ROUSSEEUW & ANNICK M. LEROY, ROBUST REGRESSION 
AND OUTLIER DETECTION (2003). Some researchers, however, may not use these techniques. 
43 T. Dudley Wallace, Pretest Estimation in Regression: A Survey, 59 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 431, 431 (1977) (“Given the nature of 
economic data, pretesting has been and probably will continue to be widely used in spite of sharp criticism.”). 
44 The traditional t statistic will be inaccurate when researchers test numerous regression specifications and then focus only on 
those whose t statistics appear to produce statistically significant results. See, e.g., Dmitry Danilov & Jan R. Magnus, Forecast 
Accuracy with Pretesting with an Application to the Stock Market, 23 J. FORECASTING 251 (2004). 
45 See Jeff Strnad, Should Legal Empiricists Go Bayesian?, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 195, 197 (2007) (noting that in law, “the 
researcher is dealing with observational data that cannot be extended by additional experimentation”). 
46 See John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 791 (2005). 
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example, they criticized a study by Hashem Dezhbakhsh and Joanna Shepherd,47 focusing first 
on a cross-sectional analysis of homicide trends in states that either abolished or adopted the 
death penalty. Dohonue and Wolfers argue that the same general trends existed in states that had 
not changed death penalty policy, and reanalyzed the data with a difference-in-differences 
approach. This produced statistically insignificant results.48  
This does not mean that every empirical question will yield an uncertain answer. But the 
death penalty is hardly the only debate about which scholarly experts have hotly contested 
empirical outcomes. Other recent examples in the criminological context include debates about 
whether abortion legalization is responsible for the decrease in the crime rate,49 and whether 
statutes allowing citizens to carry concealed handguns lower violent crime rates.50 Whatever the 
merits, academics and policymakers have not reached consensus on these questions. Even if the 
median voter or median decisionmaker would be swayed by empirical results, it will not be easy 
to determine what to believe. 
Publication bias is a danger in randomized studies too.51 But there is less room for 
identifying alternative empirical specifications given the centrality of the random variable. As 
Esther Duflo has noted, in retrospective studies, “[e]x post the researchers or evaluators define 
their own comparison group, and thus may be able to pick a variety of plausible comparison 
groups,”52 but in a randomized study, the treatment and comparison groups will generally be 
clearly defined. There is still some danger that researchers will decide not to publish, but that 
danger is considerably reduced when governmental institutions have sponsored the research by 
supporting the randomization of policy and a particular set of researchers has promised to 
                                                 
47 See Hashem Dezhbakhsh & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Evidence from a Judicial 
Experiment (Emory Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 04-04, 2003), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=432621. 
48 Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 46, at 800-04. 
49 The paper that started the debate is John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, 116 
Q.J. ECON. 379 (2001). 
50 At the center of this debate is the book JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME (1998). 
51 Selective publication of results has been most clearly demonstrated in the medical arena, though the studies do not assess 
whether selective publication is a result of self-censorship by authors (perhaps because they do not want to suggest that a drug 
was ineffective) or by journals. See, e.g., Eric H. Turner, M.D. et al., Selective Publication of Antidepressant Trials and Its 
Influence on Apparent Efficacy, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 252 (Jan. 17, 2008) (analyzing which reviews of antidepressant agents 
submitted to the FDA were subsequently published). 
52 Esther Duflo, Scaling Up and Evaluation, 2004 ANN. WORLD BANK CONF. ON DEVEL. ECON. 341, 353. 
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analyze the effects of the experiment. Indeed, governments can virtually eliminate the risk by 
requiring publication of experimental results as a condition of funding. 
B. The Laboratory of the States Reconsidered 
For statistical research to influence policy, rather than merely serve as a sound bite, it 
must not only be executed well, but also be executed in a way that policymakers can understand 
and cannot ignore. These challenges pose hurdles for a frequent justification of federalism, that 
allowing states to make independent choices provides for a kind of laboratory testing of policy.53 
Susan Rose-Ackerman has shown that federalism may insufficiently promote experimentation 
for numerous reasons,54 for example because one state may hope to free-ride on the activities of 
other governments.55 Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley have similarly noted that 
experimentation sometimes may be expensive and likely not on balance beneficial for the 
experimenter, 56 and so centralized coordination may be needed to take full advantage of 
federalism. 57 
Yet, at least sometimes, states do change their policies and take risks in doing so in the 
hope of achieving informational benefits.58 As Barry Friedman notes, states may innovate for a 
variety of reasons, quite apart from any desire to engage in “experimentation.”59 These state 
innovations serve at least a crude experimentation function.60 Commentators may observe that 
                                                 
53 The classic statement of this theory is Justice Brandeis’s. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). For a 
discussion of this justification for federalism, Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism and Constitutional 
Rights, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1750-76 (2004). 
54 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980). 
55 Id. at 594. The possibility that there might be insufficient incentives to innovate is apparent even in areas in which state 
competition has generally been trumpted, such as corporate governance law. See Michael Abramowicz, Speeding up the Crawl to 
the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 139 (2003) (arguing that there are suboptimal incentives for states to innovate in corporate law). But 
see Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. 
ON REG. 209 (2006) (arguing that states are in fact effective laboratories in the corporate charter context). 
56 Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 923-26 (1994).  
57 Id. at 926 (noting that absent coordination by a central authority, “state-initiated experiments are unlikely to be truly useful to 
other states because of more specific, technical variations” among the states). 
58 See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787-88 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[S]tate 
experimentation is no judicial myth.”).   
59 Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 399 (1997) (“’Innovation’ might have been a better word choice 
for Justice Brandeis than ‘experimentation,’ saving us all a lot of bother.”). 
60 Dorf and Sabel express more confidence in the ability of state innovations to improve knowledge, as long as there is some 
centralized evaluation of state activities. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 2, at 345 (explaining how administrative agencies can 
serve as “the continuing organized link between the national and the local, helping to create through national action the local 
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one state’s approach to a particular issue, such as health care reform,61 has gone particularly 
badly or well, and this may influence their decisionmaking. Federalism, however, does not easily 
facilitate a scientific approach to experimentation. The difficulty that social scientists and 
especially policymakers face in assessing the results of state innovations contributes to the 
inaptness of the states-as-laboratories metaphor.  
Still, federalism may be more conducive to experimentation than alternatives. Previous 
commentators have noted that randomized experiments are much more common in North 
America than in the rest of the world,62 and speculated that federalism may help explain this.63 In 
any event, the mere existence of different jurisdictions could be conducive to randomized 
experimentation in two ways. First, it may be possible to randomize policies across states, at 
least among states that consent. It would be more awkward to randomize policies in the absence 
of generally accepted jurisdictional boundaries. And second, states themselves can serve as loci 
for experimentation at smaller jurisdictional levels, such as cities and counties. Indeed, 
randomized experiments have increasingly been conducted within states.64  
IV. CAVEATS: LIMITS OF RANDOMIZATION STUDIES 
A. Interpretive Problems 
Advocates of randomized studies have emphasized that only this type of study can 
establish causality with high confidence. For example, Esther Duflo has argued that “while it is 
always possible to reject experimental results on the grounds that the experiment was poorly 
designed, or failed, when an experiment is correctly implemented (which is relatively easy to 
ascertain), there is no doubt that it gives us the effect of the manipulation that was 
implemented.”65 But what “is relatively easy to ascertain” may still remain controversial in 
public debate. Moreover, even if the measured effects can be confidently traced to the 
“manipulation,” some extrapolation will generally be needed to assess the full consequences of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
conditions for experimentation, and changing national arrangements accordingly.”). 
61 See, e.g., Sara Rosenbaum, Mothers and Children Last: The Oregon Medicaid Experiment, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 97 (1992). 
62 See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 38 (noting as an exception that the Netherlands tested an unemployment-counseling 
program). 
63 Id. One justification for this is that “[f]ederal funds for particular programs may be used with considerable discretion by the 
states, and this fact has encouraged the view that the states should literally be the laboratories of democracy.” Id.  
64 See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 37-38. 
65 Esther Duflo, Field Experiments in Development Economics (Jan. 2006), http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/800, at 23. 
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law enacting the legal experiment. This section explains that this is so because legal experiments 
will not generally be double-blind, because it may be difficult to generalize from the 
experimental context to the ultimate policy context, and because of the possibility that 
randomization may be imperfect. 
1. Non-Double Blind Randomization 
The purest form of randomized experiments includes informational control on both the 
researcher and the subjects.  In double-blind experiments, for example, neither the researchers 
nor the subjects know the identity of the treated and untreated subjects during the course of the 
experiment. Under a double-blind design, the researcher remains blinded about each subject’s 
group until the researcher has coded all the outcome variables. Researchers who remain in the 
dark when coding outcomes cannot shade their coding to favor a particular outcome. Hence, 
double-blind designs can protect against “observer bias.”66 Keeping subjects in the dark as to 
whether they are in the treatment group or not analogously ensures that their behavior and 
emotional outlook are not biased by the knowledge of how they are being treated.  In medicine, 
the standard way to implement patient ignorance is with placebo-controlled studies. In a placebo-
controlled drug study, for example, all patients would receive pills, but the control group would 
receive a placebo (from the Latin for “I will please”) pill, often a sugar pill.67 
In randomized tests on laws and public information, it will be harder to keep subjects in 
the dark about how they are being treated or that they are subjects in an experiment. For 
example, suppose that randomly selected workplaces were to be subject to a more rigorous set of 
workplace safety standards, to help assess the costs and benefits of higher standards. Businesses 
would need to know which set of workplace safety standards applied to them. But the 
transparency of this randomization is not as large a concern here as in a medical context. Medical 
researchers are primarily interested in the impact of the drug independent of any psychological 
placebo effects. In the policy arena, researchers want to see how knowledge of the law impacts 
people’s behavior. Information about whether a workplace is treated becomes part of the 
                                                 
66  RON MCQUEEN & CHRISTINA KNUSSEN, INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH METHODS AND STATISTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY (2006).  
67 Austin Flint in 1863 conducted the first placebo-controlled experiment when he treated a small number of hospital inmates for 
rheumatic fever.  The control group received what Flint called a “placebo” or “placeboic remedy” of a “very largely diluted” 
tincture of quassia. See AUSTIN FLINT, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPALS AND PRACTICES OF MEDICINE (1866).    
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treatment, but this is not inherently bad, because the researcher wants to know whether a known 
legal change will have an impact. 
There is, however, another problem. Even when subjects don’t know whether they are in 
the treatment or control group, they will typically know that they are participating in a 
randomized experiment. This knowledge of participation by itself may affect results. The impact 
of knowing that they are being observed might, for example, make subjects alter their behavior 
to please (or to displease) the researcher. In 1955 Henry Landsberger recognized, in a set of 
ergonomic experiments at the Hawthorne Works near Chicago, that subject knowledge of the 
experiment might affect subject behavior.68 The researchers found a short-term improvement in 
worker performance after almost any change in lighting.69 But productivity soon returned to 
normal levels. Although there remains some controversy over whether the experimental context 
did affect productivity in that experiment,70 the label “Hawthorne effect” is now commonly 
applied to describe changes in behavior attributable to the knowledge by individuals that they are 
experimental subjects, rather than in response to the substance of the experimental manipulation. 
Similarly, the phrase “John Henry effects”71 is used to describe changes in behavior in 
comparison groups that recognize that they are not being subject to experimental 
manipulations.72 
In medical randomized trials, Hawthorne effects are a concern, because the ethical 
requirement of informed consent necessitates that subjects be informed about and consent to 
participate in the randomized trial.73 In the legal context, sometimes knowledge of a change does 
not necessitate that subjects know that they are taking part in a randomized study. For example, 
                                                 
68 HENRY A. LANDSBERGER, HAWTHORNE REVISITED (1958). 
69
 RICHARD GILLESPIE, MANUFACTURING KNOWLEDGE: A HISTORY OF THE HAWTHORNE EXPERIMENTS (1985).  
70 Compare, e.g., WILLIAM H. WHYTE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN 34 (1956) (claiming that increased productivity in an 
industrial experiment by Hawthorne was a result of experimenters’ behavior toward those treated), with Stephen R.G. Jones, Was 
There a Hawthorne Effect?, 98 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 451 (1992) (questioning the existence of the effect by scrutinizing 
Hawthorne’s original study). 
71 See, e.g., Allen C. Barrett & Doris A. White, How John Henry Effects Confound the Measurement of Self-Esteem in Primary 
Prevention Programs for Drug Abuse in Middle Schools, 36 J. ALCOHOL & DRUG EDUC. 87 (1991) (providing an alleged example 
of John Henry effects). 
72 DUFLO ET AL., supra note 87, at 68 (“The comparison group may feel offended to be a comparison group and react by also 
altering their behavior (for example, teachers in the comparison group for an evaluation may ‘compete’ with the treatment 
teachers or, on the contrary, decide to slack off).”). 
73  David A. Braunholtz, Are Randomized Clinical Trials Good for Us (in the Short Term)? Evidence for a “Trial Effect,” 54 J. 
CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 217 (2001). 
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one could imagine a test of speed limits where the posted limits on different roads were 
randomly increased or decreased. The drivers on these roads could be informed of the treatment 
(i.e., the speed limit on that road) without necessarily knowing that they were participating in a 
randomized experiment. But there may be other cases in which almost all subjects will know that 
there is a legal experiment. In an experiment on workplace safety, at least the businesses subject 
to the new rules would be likely to find out the reason for the new rules, and it seems likely that 
others in the industry would also recognize the experimental context. This could, for example, 
lead business owners to be temporarily more cognizant of workplace safety issues, possibly 
muting the effects of the higher standards. In addition, businesses may act in a particular way or 
report misleading data because they hope to affect the ultimate policy result, though this is less 
likely to be a concern if there are a large number of businesses in the experiment, so that each 
business is likely to have only a small effect. 
2. Generalizability 
The prior section noted the difficulty of extrapolating from a sample with certain 
informational attributes—such as subjects knowing they were participating in an experiment—to 
a population with different informational attributes. There are analogous problems of 
extrapolation where the tested sample may be unrepresentative of the larger population. James 
Heckman, with a number of different coauthors, has written extensively about these dangers of 
“randomization bias” in policy experiments, which “cause the type of persons participating in a 
program [treatment group] to differ from the type that would participate in the program as it 
normally operates.”74 This may occur as a result of self-selection, because volunteers for an 
experiment differ from those to whom a policy might apply, or because of what we call 
“experimenter selection,” where the experimental design differs from how a permanent policy 
would operate in terms of the group affected or in some other way. 
                                                 
74 James J. Heckman & Jeffrey A. Smith, Assessing the Case for Social Experiments, 9 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 85 (1995); see 
also James Heckman & Richard Robb, Alternative Methods for Evaluating the Impact of Interventions, in LONGITUDINAL 
ANALYSIS OF LABOR MARKET DATA 156-245 (James Heckman & Burton Singer eds., 1985); James Heckman & Jeffrey Smith, 
Assessing the Case for Randomized Evaluation of Social Programs, in MEASURING LABOUR MARKET MEASURES: EVALUATING 
THE EFFECTS OF ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES 35-95 (Karsten Jensen & Per Kongshoj Madsen eds., 1993); James Heckman, 
Randomization and Social Program Evaluation, in EVALUATING WELFARE AND TRAINING PROGRAMS 201, 201-03 (Charles 
Manski & Irwin Garfinkel eds., 1992); James Heckman & V. J. Hotz, Choosing Among Alternative Nonexperimental Methods for 
Estimating the Impact of Social Programs: The Case of Manpower Training, 84 J. AM. STAT. ASSOC. 862 (1989).  
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a) Self-selection 
One problem is that it may be inappropriate to extrapolate from subjects who have 
volunteered or at least consented to be tested to a population containing people who would not 
volunteer or consent. If the attributes of people that lead them not to consent also lead them to 
react differently to the treatment, then the treatment may produce different effects on the general 
population. Volunteers are a self-selecting group that is seeking exposure to an experimental 
policy. The causal impact of the experimental policy on this self-selecting group may be 
different than the causal impact of the policy on the average individual affected by the policy.75 
Chemotherapy drugs, for example, increase the life expectancy of some cancer patients, but 
decrease the life expectancy (because of their side effects) of those free of cancer. Volunteers for 
experiments on chemotherapy drugs may not provide good estimates for the effect of the 
experimental chemotherapy on cancer patients. Volunteers may generally be sicker than the 
average cancer patient and therefore ready to try unproven therapies.  
As with drugs, so with policies. The volunteers for a policy experiment only give an 
accurate estimate of the causal effects of the policy if the volunteers are representative of the 
group of individuals that will be affected by the fully enacted policy. Consider an experimental 
job skills program. People who volunteer for such a program may be particularly likely to be 
helped by this program. Experimenters can attempt to control for differential effects, but some of 
the variables that affect the response to the job skills program for volunteers will be 
unobservable. Volunteers may be particularly disciplined in following the program (raising the 
impact of the program) and the discipline of volunteers may be unobservable or uncorrelated 
with other observables. In this case, the estimated effect of the program for volunteers will be 
higher than the effect of the average low-skill person and experimenters cannot adjust their effect 
estimates to account for discipline. If policymakers are considering making the program 
mandatory for people of a certain skill level, then the experimental estimate of the program’s 
effect using volunteers is biased. Volunteer experiments can, however, guide policymakers 
determining whether to offer—but not madate-- a policy to the general population. Under 
voluntary programs, the government’s offer is in some sense the treatment. 
                                                 
75 When causal impacts of a treatment vary across individuals, the treatment effect is called “heterogeneous.” For a discussion of 
heterogeneous treatment effects, see James J. Heckman, Micro Data, Heterogeneity, and the Evaluation of Public Policy: Nobel 
Lecture, 109 J. POL. ECON. 673 (2001).   
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Sometimes, treatment will affect volunteers and compelled individuals similarly. In 
medicine, it is routine to move from randomized tests on volunteers to quasi-mandatory across-
the-board treatment proposals for individuals whose condition is similar to those who were 
subject to experiments. The problem, however, may in general be more severe for legal 
experiments, because it often may be even more difficult in a legal context to control for other 
characteristics. We can make some headway in measuring the severity of cancer according to test 
results and symptoms. But individual psychology and business strategies are so diverse that it 
will often be difficult to come up with metrics that serve as effective controls.  
Government can respond to this “voluntariness” problem by designing tests with 
mandatory participation. Ethical rules require that patients consent to participation in medical 
experiments, but government can and has applied different rules and regulations to different 
individuals and businesses. Thus, for example, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
Act of 1991 authorized the U.S. Department of Labor to test the impact of a job search assistant 
program by randomly requiring certain recipients of unemployment insurance to participate in 
the program.76  
b) Experimenter Selection 
Even when an experimenter can compel participation, there is still a danger that the 
experimental context may differ from the context in which a policy ultimately would be 
implemented. The experiment might affect a different population, be on a smaller scale, involve 
a different legal change, test only marginal policy changes, occur for only a limited period of 
time, or involve greater or lesser commitments of resources. 
The population may differ if an experiment is tried in only one location or only with 
some nonrandom subset of the individuals and entities who would eventually be affected by a 
law. Cost considerations may justify such nonrepresentativeness, and indeed it is common for 
“demonstration projects” to be deployed in one or more particular regions rather than 
randomly.77 At times, skepticism about inferences from an experiment on a nonrepresentative 
                                                 
76 PAUL T. DECKER ET AL., ASSISTING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE CLAIMANTS: THE LONG-TERM IMPACTS OF THE JOB SEARCH 
ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION (2000), available at http://www.upjohninst.org/erdc/jsa/execsumm.pdf; Marcus Stanley et al., 
Developing Skills: What We Know About the Impacts of American Employment and Training Programs on Employment, 
Earnings, and Educational Outcomes (Harvard Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper, 1998). 
77 For a discussion of the transition from local demonstration projects to projects on a national scale, see Duflo, supra note 52, at 
342-45. 
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population may be justified.78 For example, a randomized workplace safety experiment on a 
sample of small firms might not extrapolate easily to a sample of large firms. Sometimes, it may 
be feasible to conduct randomization at a national level, for example in choosing Medicare 
recipients who will receive extra follow-up phone calls. If policy is to be implemented at a 
national level, then this will provide a sound assessment of policy. Often, however, coordination 
and data-gathering needs may make this difficult.  
Moreover, even if policy is to be implemented at a national level, that does not 
necessarily mean that a single uniform policy will be optimal. Randomized results give powerful 
and powerfully transparent information about the average impact of the law on policy outcomes, 
but teasing out causal information on subgroups of the population is much more difficult.79 For 
example, imagine that a speed limit study randomizing across different cities shows that twenty 
mph limits produce more accidents than thirty mph limits. It might still be that small, rural cities 
fare better with the lower limit. It is possible to run regressions on the results of randomized 
studies to test whether the average result holds true for subgroups within the tested sample. As 
long as the treatment is randomly applied across small cities, for example, the small cities 
subsample can be viewed as a sub-experiment. But because a population can be divided in any 
number of ways, and because statistically significant results are likely to exist by chance for 
some subsamples, researchers will occasionally need to draw admittedly arbitrary lines, and must 
use theoretical considerations to help assess whether statistically significant results for 
subpopulations seem plausible.  
Scale may be an even more important concern. A common criticism of laboratory 
experiments is that people may not behave as they would in other decisionmaking contexts, 
because the stakes are too trivial.80 Similar problems can affect randomized experiments. 
Suppose, for example, that the federal government tested the minimum wage by randomly 
selecting one percent of adults, allowing those selected the option of informing employers that 
they would not need to be paid minimum wage. In theory, eliminating the minimum wage might 
                                                 
78 See, e.g., GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 15 (““[I]mpact estimates frequently are limited to relatively few geographic 
areas. Because the sites are rarely selected randomly, the external validity of the evaluations can be questioned.”). 
79 James J. Heckman, Detecting Discrimination, 12 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 101 (1998).  
80 Duflo, supra note 65, at 21. This helps explain why researchers studying social norms through ultimatum games have 
experimented in developing countries, where it is feasible to make the stakes large enough to affect experimental subjects’ 
welfare. See, e.g., Robert Slonim & Alvin E. Roth, Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak 
Republic, 66 ECONOMETRICA 569 (1998). 
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increase employment. But businesses may not think it worthwhile to change their hiring 
practices, or to risk dissension from inconsistent wages, to have the chance to hire a few workers 
at a lower wage. Data from such a study therefore might not reliably reflect the effect of 
eliminating the minimum wage.81  
 
In addition,, the legal changes effected by an experiment will generally be temporary, and 
responses to temporary laws may be different from responses to permanent laws. Sometimes an 
experiment measures only marginal effects, either because the experiment is temporary or 
because the experiment explicitly limits itself to an intervention at the margin.82 There is no 
guarantee that marginal effects will at least correctly identify the approximate impact of the 
policy. For example, in the hypothetical concealed carry experiment, a permanent law might 
encourage more people to possess concealed handguns than a temporary law, but it is not clear 
how the additional group of adopters differs from the group that responds even to the temporary 
law. Perhaps the initial responders will tend to include more criminals seeking to take advantage 
of the law and the subsequent group will be more law-abiding, but this is only speculation.  
At other times, a temporary law may be a poor proxy for long term effects because the 
law will have dynamic as well as static effects. Studies, for example, that seek to assess private 
school choice plans may fail to capture what proponents of such plans claim is a principal 
benefit, that free enterprise will allow educational entrepreneurs to learn over time what works.83 
Other arguments, however, suggest that a static analysis might overestimate the benefits of free 
choice; for example, in the short term for-profit schools might be willing to lose money in the 
hope of increasing the chance of being permitted to continue to receive public funds in the 
future. As another example, critics of the time-of-use electricity experiments argued that with a 
longer term study, customers would buy appliances that would help them adjust their electricity 
use based on time of day.84  
                                                 
81 This hypothetical study is not valueless, however. The fact that change is “not worth the trouble” suggests that the benefits of 
the experimental policy are limited to some degree. 
82 See, e.g., Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, Expanding Credit Access: Using Randomized Supply Decisions to Estimate the 
Impacts (June 25, 2007), available at http://ipa.phpwebhosting.com/images_ipa/ExpandingCreditAccess.v3.pdf (reporting an 
experiment in which lending criteria were loosened for randomly selected marginal borrowers). 
83 See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, Beyond the Free Market: The Structure of School Choice, 2008 BYU L. REV. 557, 571 (2008) 
(making this point). 
84 See, e.g., JOSKOW at 46 (noting that “these experiments only allow us to estimate short-run elasticities of demand, given 
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3. Imperfect Randomization 
The above sections have addressed the danger that the tested population might differ 
systematically from the more general population to which a legal experiment would apply. There 
is also, however, another problem – ensuring that in the population experimented upon, the 
treatment group receives the treatment and the control group does not. A computer can 
randomize between treatment and control groups, but it is not always straightforward to ensure 
that the decisions made by the computer are followed and that the results are properly measured. 
Dangers include attrition (where some randomized individuals or entities drop out of a study), 
crossover (where some control group members receive the treatment, or vice versa), and 
spillovers (where the treatment has some effect on the control group as well). 
a) Attrition 
Attrition is a problem not merely because it decreases the size of the sample, but also 
because it may bias experimental results when the attrition rate depends on selection for 
treatment. Consider, for example, studies assessing improvements made by schools in a 
developing country. A school’s randomization into a comparison group might increase drop-out 
rates.85 If the drop-outs tend to be the weaker students, and if the measurement of school success 
depends on tests of current students, then the attrition produces an artificial hurdle for the 
treatment. Attrition can also bias results when randomization occurs at the level of the individual. 
In a medical study, for example, people who receive the treatment but then suffer severe side 
effects might refuse to participate further in the study, making those who continue with the 
treatment a nonrepresentative sample. 
Given any degree of attrition, those reviewing a study may argue about the best 
interpretation of the results. Statisticians may attempt to impute measurements for those who 
drop out, by comparing their characteristics with those of other subjects.86 But this solution is 
imperfect, because there might be some unmeasurable difference between those who continue in 
                                                                                                                                                             
existing appliance stocks”).  
85 See, e.g., Abhijit V. Banerjee et al., Remedying Education: Evidence from Two Randomized Experiments in India, 122 Q.J. 
ECON. 1235, 1245 (2007) (discussing this problem). 
86 See, e.g., Richard B. Miller & David W. Wright, Detecting and Correcting Attrition Bias in Longitudinal Family Research, 57 
J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 921, 923 (1995) (describing the standard method of incorporating a variable representing the probability 
of dropping out directly into the study). 
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an experiment and those who drop out. Ultimately, sound statistical judgment is needed to assess 
such models’ reliability.  
A more objective solution is to use matched samples.87 If someone from the treatment 
group drops out, results of the corresponding match from the control group are not counted 
either. This approach can be used also when randomization is at the institutional or jurisdictional 
level, if individuals can be matched across institutions or jurisdictions. With matching, it is not 
necessary ex post to construct a model that seeks to correct for attrition bias, which would 
increase the danger of subjectivity or manipulation. Statisticians would be needed to assign the 
original matches based on observable characteristics, but the matching would be difficult to 
manipulate, before it is known who will drop out.  
b) Crossover 
Legal experimentation may be less vulnerable to crossover than other social 
experimentation. When a particular legal regime is assigned to some individual or entity, that is 
not easy to escape. But imperfections may occur nonetheless, especially if the government 
wishes to leave some room for later discretion. For example, crossover can also occur if well-
connected people can thwart random assignment. Alan Krueger, studying the effect of student to 
teacher ratios, found that some parents had managed to convince schools to reallocate their 
children from large to small classes.88 This dilutes the treatment, as the small classes become 
larger, and means that the treated students on average will come from relatively highly motivated 
families. 
Once again, statistical correctives exist. Under an “intention-to-treat” methodology,89 an 
individual or entity who crosses over is counted with the group to which that person or entity 
was originally assigned. This reduces the measured effect of the treatment. Statisticians can 
compensate for the bias introduced by the intention-to-treat approach with a simple mathematical 
                                                 
87 See ESTHER DUFLO ET AL., USING RANDOMIZATION IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS RESEARCH: A TOOLKIT 35-36 (2006), 
http://www.povertyactionlab.com/papers/Using%20Randomization%20in%20Development%20Economics.pdf (“An extreme 
version of blocked design is the pairwise matched design where pairs of units are constituted, and in each pair, one unit is 
randomly assigned to the treatment and one unit is randomly assigned to the control.”). 
88 Alan B. Krueger, Experimental Estimates of Education Production Functions, 114 Q.J. ECON. 497, 505 (1999) (reporting 
higher attrition rates of students in smaller classes). 
89 See, e.g., Guido Imbens & Joshua Angrist, Identification and Estimation of Local Average Treatment Effects, 62 
ECONOMETRICA 467 (1994) (discussing this approach).. 
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formula.90 Assuming that it is possible to measure who ended up receiving the treatment and who 
ended up receiving the control, the formula can be applied mechanically, without allowing any 
discretion to the experimenters, and will generally improve the estimate of the treatment effect. 
This is an imperfect adjustment, because those who cross over may differ systematically from 
those who do not. Once again, this illustrates that even with randomized statistical 
methodologies, such statistical judgment may be needed to interpret the study results. 
c) Spillovers  
The final danger is that the treatment will spill over on the control group. Suppose, for 
example, that a shame sanction reduces recidivism not only in those who are shamed, but also in 
those who are randomized to the control group but hear about the shaming. Or, suppose that 
firms randomized to a relaxed securities disclosure regime decide that they want to disclose as 
much as their competitors. The comparison of treatment and control groups will underestimate 
the effects of the intervention. On the other hand, suppose that a random experiment eliminates 
speed limits on a random set of roads. Some drivers on the control roads may conclude that 
police, needing to fill their time somehow, will devote extra attention to the control roads. If 
these drivers slow down, measurements of the speed differential will be exaggerated. 
A sometimes feasible solution is to randomize across geographical areas rather than 
individuals. Edward Miguel and Michael Kremer showed that randomized studies at an 
individual level had underestimated the benefits of deworming drugs, which benefited those in 
the immediate area who had not received the drugs.91 Randomizing across geographical areas 
largely solved the problem. This solution is not without drawbacks, however. Especially if the 
number of jurisdictions is small, a comparison of changes in treatment and control jurisdictions 
may not have much statistical power. In addition, some people may move to take advantage of 
the law elsewhere.92  
                                                 
90 As Esther Duflo explains, a statistician can “scale up the difference [between the treatment and the control group] by dividing 
it by the difference in the probability of receiving the treatment in those two groups.” Duflo, supra note 52, at 354.  
91 Edward Miguel & Michael Kremer, Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the Presence of Treatment 
Externalities, 72 ECONOMETRICA 159 (2004). 
92 Randomization across geographic areas can produce Tiebout sorting in much the same way as endogenous policy selection. 
See generally Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (providing the seminal account 
of the effects of citizen mobility). 
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B. Other Issues 
1. Costs 
Experimental costs include implementation costs and direct experimental policy costs. 
Other things equal, the lower these costs for a given policy, the stronger the argument for 
experimentation. Implementing a policy experiment can be an expensive task. Policymakers 
must first overcome obstacles to experimentation, such as citizen opposition. When opposition to 
randomization is high, convincing the experimental subjects that the experiment is in their 
interest may necessitate more effort than the value of the information that the experiment would 
yield. Once an experiment is approved, the implementation costs continue. Policymakers must 
inform individuals subject to the experimental policy about the change in policy, while making 
clear to the rest of the population (the control group) that their policy landscape remains 
unchanged. Adding to the complexity, a policy experiment’s “laboratory” is the everyday world 
of human behavior, rather than the controlled setting of the scientific lab.  
This creates several complications. First, policymakers must determine means to measure 
the outcomes of interest. At times, the outcomes of interest may be reflected in preexisting data 
collection efforts, but at other times new sources of data on outcomes must be found. Such data 
gathering efforts will be costly. Second, policymakers must confront the non-compliance 
problem. Individuals are not mice and may find ways to avoid “complying” with the 
experimental treatment. Policymakers must find legitimate means of limiting such non-
compliance, but such means will generally be costly. Even so, there will always be some number 
of non-compliers, and policymakers must ascertain means of preventing attrition and non-
compliance from biasing the results of the experiment. 
It is possible to used randomized testing to test many different variations on policies. For 
example, a test of speed limits could allow for a wide range of speed limits, or could test whether 
a tailored policy (of thirty mph in small cities and twenty mph in large cities) is superior to an 
untailored policy (of thirty mph in all cities).93 But the possibilities for tailoring in any particular 
                                                 
93 Randomized testing of this kind on the Internet has shown, for example, that tailoring a retail website’s landing pages to be 
contingent on specific search queries produces more sales than a one-size-fits-all homepage.  Thus, clicking on a Google ad for 
www.musiciansfriend.com after searching for “electric guitar” will take you to a different page than clicking on the same ad does 
after searching for “electric bass” because randomized testing of contingent strategy by Omniture showed higher revenue per 
customer of 15% when the landing pages were tailored to the specific search queries.  Conversation with Matt Roche, President, 
Omniture, (June 14, 2007). 
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arena are endless, and it is unreasonable to expect that more than a tiny fraction of these 
possibilities will ever be tested. Hence, it will be important for lawmakers and regulators to use 
theory and intuition to guide the choice of scarce options to test with full awareness that untested 
policies may still dominate. Sometimes, it may be worthwhile to focus on what seems to be the 
most attractive possibility, even if there is some chance that later a more attractive option will 
emerge. 
Happily, the costs of experimental design and implementation are subject to economies 
of scale. If legislators and administrators begin to implement many experiments, then they will 
learn effective techniques for experimentation. In addition, public familiarity with experimental 
processes may reduce the costs of convincing the public to participate in experiments and reduce 
the costs of explaining the experimental policy to the subjects of the policy. Thus, the marginal 
costs of experimental policies should be declining with the number of policies. A widespread and 
systematic emphasis on policy experimentation would decrease costs with respect to the current 
practice of piecemeal government policy experimentation.  
Economies of scale reduce the marginal costs of experimentation, but cannot eliminate 
them. As a result, policymakers should first pursue experiments of policies that have low 
experimentation costs, all else equal. While it is impossible to provide a complete description of 
the factors influencing the costs of experimentation, several salient policy features are worth 
examining. Most obviously, policymakers should experiment with policies that have relatively 
positive expected effects.94 In other words, policymakers should experiment with the best 
candidates first. This will reduce the direct costs of experimentation on the subjects of the 
experimental policy. Meanwhile, experiments should generally be as modest as possible but big 
enough to have measurable effects.  
An additional consideration is that concentrated populations of experimental subjects are 
likely to have lower experimental implementation costs than diffuse subject populations. 
Informing the entire national population of the existence of a randomized experiment and of each 
individual’s status as subject or control within the experiment is likely to be prohibitively 
expensive. By contrast, informing each company on the New York Stock Exchange of the 
                                                 
94 Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480 (2008) argues that, in many cases, the expected effect 
of policy is less important than the variance of the expected effects. Other things equal, however, higher expected value policies 
are superior to lower expected value policies.  
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existence of an experiment, as well as the company’s experimental status, will be much easier. 
The population of NYSE companies is clearly defined and finite, reducing the costs of the 
experiment. As a result, policymakers should first pursue experimental policies when the target 
population of the policy is small, ceteris paribus.  
2. Ethical Concerns 
This Article’s treatment of the ethics of randomized legal experiments will be brief for 
two reasons. First, the Article’s general argument does not depend on a resolution of whether the 
government must obtain informed consent. Even with an informed consent requirement, 
randomized experimentation could still occur for many policies. For example, there will 
generally be no ethical objections to an experiment like the Medicare experiment,95 where any 
participant may choose not to receive the services offered by the government. (There may be 
objections based on inequality among those who volunteer for the experiment, an issue to which 
the Article will return below.96) Second, an existing collection of essays already explores this 
issue in considerable detail.97  
This section will briefly summarize and develop the argument that legal experimentation 
imposes no ethical hurdles beyond those inherent in general legal policymaking, while also 
sketching the opposing position. The argument against an informed consent requirement 
distinguishes legal from medical experimentation,98 where informed consent is generally 
required.99 An unconsented-to medical treatment violates a patient’s bodily integrity rights.100 
The problem is not randomization. A state could not insist that all of its citizens take a new drug. 
                                                 
95 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
96 See infra Part V.B.1.b. 
97 See ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION (Alice M. Rivlin & P. Michael Tipane eds., 1975). 
98 Rivlin and Timpane summarize this argument as follows: 
[S]chool officials make decisions all the time that involve adoption of new curricula or educational approaches without 
firm knowledge of what the effects will be. There is always some chance of harm to some or all children which has to 
be weighed against the possible benefits of the change. Calling the change an ‘experiment’ does not alter the moral 
dilemma involved or call for special rules. Such rules might have the perverse effect of putting special obstacles in the 
way of careful examination and evaluation of change, while allowing quite drastic changes that had no experimental or 
tentative flavor to proceed unquestioned. 
Alice M. Rivlin & P. Michael Timpane, Introduction and Summary, in ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION, 
supra note 97, at 1, 5. 
99 See Kathryn A. Tuthill, Human Experimentation, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 221 (1997). 
100 An early legal case insisting on informed consent frames the problem in these terms: “Every human being of adult years and 
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his 
patient’s consent commits an assault, for which he is liable.” Schloendorff v. New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). 
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Any rights that the individual has against the state constrain the state in legal experimentation. 
So, if a person has a right not to have property taken by the state,101 then the state cannot take that 
property in an experiment. But to the extent that a government can enact a policy generally, on 
the Lockean theory of implicit consent,102 there should be no ethical bar to the state enacting the 
policy only against a random set of individuals.  
The opposing position flows from the Kantian principle that each person should be 
treated as an end rather than only as a means.103 This principle also does not uniquely condemn 
randomization. Suppose a jurisdiction decides to enact a new universally applicable policy, even 
though policymakers suspect that it will not be effective but has enough of a chance of success to 
make it worth trying. If this counts as treating people as means only, then the ethical 
permissibility of a new policy must be judged excluding from consideration any benefit from the 
fact that implementation of the policy will produce information about the policy. But many legal 
regimes, such as patent law and securities law, are justified in part on the basis that they improve 
information. Information produced by a policy about the policy itself should not be uniquely 
condemned to irrelevance. 
But assuming then that experimentation with universally applicable policies is ethical, is 
random policy experimentation ethical as well? An affirmative case focuses on the benefit of 
randomization, that it will produce better information than nonrandomized experiments.104 
Although this may at first appear to be a purely consequentialist justification, Robert Veatch 
argues that subjects of research have a right not to be put “at risk in an unnecessary experiment 
or one inefficiently designed.”105 The Nuremberg principles on medical experimentation 
emphasized the importance of experimental design.106 If universal experimentation is 
permissible, there is an a fortiori argument that random experimentation must be permissible as 
                                                 
101 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). 
102 See Peter G. Brown, Informed Consent in Social Experimentation: Some Cautionary Notes, in ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF 
SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 97, at 95-96. 
103 See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 429 (H.J. Paton trans., Harper & Row 1964) (1785) 
(“Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a 
means but always at the same time as an end.”). 
104 See supra Part IV. 
105 Robert M. Veatch, Ethical Principles in Medical Experimentation, in ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL 
EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 97, at 21, 37. 
106 Id. at 37-38. 
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well. The difference between the universal and the random experiment is that some people do not 
receive the treatment. Unless there is an equality right to receive the treatment,107 this difference 
should not make the experiment more problematic. 
Medical experimentation itself further supports the argument that if universal policy 
experiments are permissible, policy experiments must be permissible as well, because medical 
experiments can generally be viewed equivalently as legal experiments. Subjects in medical 
experiments who give informed consent presumably would prefer a guarantee of receiving the 
treatment rather than a chance of a placebo. The status quo is a legal regime that constrains 
liberty by forbidding distribution of the treatment. Let us assume that the legal prohibition on 
what Eugene Volokh has called “medical self-defense” is permissible.108 When the government 
authorizes a medical experiment,109 it is effectively authorizing a new legal regime in which 
patients are permitted to have access to a treatment. The government does not authorize this new 
legal regime in a universally applicable way, but instead insists on randomization. Only some 
patients will legally have access to the treatment. It is thus sometimes permissible for new legal 
policies, including potentially pernicious ones, to be introduced randomly.  
This suggests that policy randomization is permissible, at least so long as the group being 
randomized gives informed consent. The argument for informed consent, however, depends on 
the legitimacy of legal baselines: both Policy X and Policy Y are by assumption legally 
permissible options for policymakers, but if the current policy is X, then citizens may only be 
subject to Policy Y if they give informed consent, and vice-versa. The medical experimentation 
context shows how policymakers can manipulate such baselines. If the baseline were to allow 
patients to take a medication, then few would consent to being subject to a legal experiment in 
which they might at random be denied the right to the medicine (equivalently, to a medical 
experiment in which they might receive a placebo instead).  
Those who defend the legitimacy of medical experimentation must either develop an 
account of which baselines are permissible or allow legal policymakers to play the same game 
                                                 
107 See infra Part V.B.1.b. 
108 See generally Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Devel. Drugs v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) 
(finding no constitutional right to investigational drugs); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental 
Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (2007) (arguing for a right to medical self-defense).  
109 Government experimentation is necessary for at least some medical experiments. In the United States, the FDA reviews 
small-scale Phase II trials to determine whether to permit large-scale Phase III trials. See, e.g., Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, 
Experimental Drug Approval, and the FDA New Drug Screening Process, 3 NYU J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 305 (1999-2000). 
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outside the medical context. Existing randomized legal experiments generally allow opt-in to an 
apparently more favorable treatment. For example, drug offenders may receive the option of 
participating in an experiment in which they might be randomized to a drug court.110 This makes 
experimentation a one-way ratchet, allowing testing within an existing draconian regime of a 
more lenient alternative, but not allowing testing of more draconian legal approaches. The only 
way to test the more draconian approaches would be to change the baseline to those approaches, 
and then to allow individuals to opt into an experiment in which they might receive more lenient 
treatment. Similarly, one could test raising the speed limit (by allowing drivers to opt into a 
program in which they are permitted to drive 10 mph over the limit), but to test lowering the 
speed limit, policymakers must change the baseline. An insistence on informed consent 
privileges the status quo legal regime over alternatives, even if neither the status quo nor the 
alternative applied universally violates any rights. 
3. Equality concerns 
Concerns about informed consent focus on the rights of those subject to the experiment. 
Concerns about equality focus on the rights of those who either are randomly excluded from an 
experiment or who are assigned to the less desirable of the treatment and control groups. The 
equality concern is not limited to random experimentation, but extends also to cases in which a 
government with limited resources distributes those resources at random.111 For example, 
governments have used lotteries to distribute scarce low-income housing,112 rights to 
immigrate,113 and positions in magnet and charter schools.114 Maurice Rosenberg points out that 
random experimentation may be inevitably in tension with the “equal protection principle . . . 
that persons subjected to significantly different treatments must be shown to be different in ways 
                                                 
110 See, e.g., Denise C. Gottfredson & M. Lyn Exum, The Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court: One-Year Results From a 
Randomized Study, 39 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 337 (2002) 
111 Such distribution has generally raised fewer objections than randomization for experimental purposes alone, and as a result 
experimentation has been particularly feasible in cases in which arbitrary decisions needed to be made in any event. See 
GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 225 (noting that in one experiment, randomization “usually became more acceptable” when 
officials “recognized that they did not have sufficient funding to serve their entire caseload and, hence, that some mechanism was 
needed to determine who would be denied services”). 
112 See, e.g., Denise Irene Arnold, Lottery Prize Is Affordable Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1988, at 12 (discussing a local 
housing lottery). 
113 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1153(e)(2) (providing for distribution of some visas “strictly in a random order”). 
114 See, e.g., Cullen et al., supra note 32 (analyzing such a lottery). 
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that supply a reasonable basis for the differences in treatment.”115 If equal protection were 
interpreted to prohibit all arbitrary legal differences among similarly situated individuals, then 
both random experimentation and other programs using random selection to award scarce 
resources must be eliminated. 
There are, however, advantages to using randomization in both these contexts. In the 
experimental context, randomization has benefits already discussed,116 and when scarce resources 
are distributed, randomization ensures that the distribution occurs without favor and in a way that 
limits rent-seeking for scarce resources.117 In the United States, the equal protection justification 
for tolerating both random experimentation and random assignment of government benefits is 
that there is a rational basis for randomization, and because there is no discrimination against a 
protected class, no higher standard than rational basis review is necessary. So, in any event, 
concludes Judge Friendly’s opinion in the leading case on this issue.118 Judge Friendly explained, 
“The Equal Protection clause does not place a state in a vise where its only choices . . . are to do 
nothing or plunge into statewide action.”119 A court someday might fail to follow or even 
overturn this precedent, but it reinforces the plausibility of the legal argument that randomization 
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.120 
But does randomization of legal requirements violate the core principles of equal 
protection? A full philosophical treatment of this question is beyond this Article’s scope, but 
Ronald Dworkin’s treatment of a related issue deserves attention. Dworkin considers the 
legitimacy of “checkerboard statutes.”121 “Why should Parliament,” he asks, “not make abortion 
criminal for pregnant women who were born in even years but not for those born in odd 
                                                 
115 Maurice Rosenberg, The Impact of Procedure-Impact Studies in the Administration of Justice, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Summer 1988, at 13, 17. 
116 See supra Part IV. 
117 Rent-seeking can still occur if large numbers of individuals may spend money to enter the lottery. See, e.g., Thomas W. 
Hazlett & Robert J. Michaels, The Cost of Rent-Seeking: Evidence from Cellular Telephone License Lotteries, 59 S. ECON. J. 425 
(1993) (analyzing a government lottery that produced 320,000 applications). 
118 Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1108-10 (2d Cir. 1973). 
119 Id. at 1109-10. One commentator has criticized the court for not indicating that its decision would be valid only for as long as 
the experimental program’s value were uncertain. Note, Reforming the One Step at a Time Justification in Equal Protection 
Cases, 90 YALE L.J. 1777, 1783 (1981). 
120 Randomization schemes may sometimes violate other constitutional provisions, however. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648 (1979) (finding random stops of vehicles to check driver’s license and registration inconsistent with the Fourth 
Amendment). 
121 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 178-84 (1986).  
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ones?”122 Dworkin imagines such a distinction arising from compromise, never considering the 
possibility that a checkerboard statute might produce useful information. The discussion 
nevertheless is useful in addressing whether arbitrary distinctions inherently violate equality 
principles.123 Dworkin claims that checkerboard statutes offend a principle that he calls 
“integrity.”124 A jurisdiction enacting such a statute as a compromise “must endorse principles to 
justify part of what it has done that it must reject to justify the rest.”125 That does not occur with 
random experimentation, where a single principle, the need to obtain more information, justifies 
both the treatment and control conditions.126 
Dworkin’s concern is that randomness seems arbitrary, but arbitrariness is often more 
troubling when it is non-random. Consider, for example, the different approaches of Justice 
Stewart and Justice Marshall in Furman v. Georgia127 to the question of whether the death 
penalty is so capricious as to deny due process. Justice Stewart criticized a state’s criminal 
system because “of all the people convicted of [capital crimes], many just as reprehensible as 
these, the petitioners [in Furman were] among a capriciously selected random handful upon 
whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed.128 Justice Marshall, meanwhile, observed 
that “[i]t also is evident that the burden of capital punishment falls upon the poor, the ignorant, 
and the underprivileged members of society.”129 If Marshall was correct (and there is abundant 
evidence that he was)130 that the death penalty is disproportionately visited upon the poor, the 
ignorant, and the underprivileged, then Justice Stewart cannot be right that the death sentence is 
randomly assigned. Marshall’s concern resonates with ex-ante equal protection concerns,131 
                                                 
122 Id. at 178. 
123 See id. at 185 (relating the checkerboard statute issue to conceptions of equality). 
124 Id. at 183. 
125 Id. at 184. 
126 Another example of Dworkin’s reaffirms that arbitrary distinctions are acceptable where not simply the result of legislative 
compromise: “Suppose we can rescue only some prisoners of tyranny; justice hardly requires rescuing none even when only luck, 
not any principle, will decide whom we save and whom we leave to torture.” Id. at 181. 
127 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
128 Id. at 313; see also id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[I]t smacks of little more than a lottery system.”); id. at 309 
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and 
unusual.”); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (“[T]here is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is 
imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”). 
129 Id. at 365-66 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
A. 130  DAVID C. BALDUS, ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990). 
131 Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234 (1966). 
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because citizens are treated differently from the get-go because of arbitrary characteristics. 
Stewart’s concern instead resonates with an ex-post equal protection perspective. Truly random 
application of law provides each citizen with ex-ante equality—an equal chance of being 
assigned to the same legal rules. A constitutional or moral concern with truly random application 
of law instead turns on arbitrarily treating equal people differently ex post. 
Many observers of the legal system may have a more visceral negative reaction to ex post 
randomness than to ex ante randomness. Justice O’Connor, in Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. 
Woodard,132 expressed a concern with a hypothetical clemency procedure: “[I]t is not too 
difficult to imagine extreme situations in which federal due process would be offended. For 
example, a procedure in which a governor or parole board merely pulled names out of a lottery 
bin or flipped coins to make clemency decisions would undoubtedly constitute a ‘meaningless 
ritual.’”133 Language of this kind suggests that courts might be hostile to truly random application 
of law. The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct in 1982 removed Jeffrey Jones, a 
Manhattan Criminal Court judge, from office for deciding in open court between a twenty- and 
thirty-day criminal sentence on the basis of a coin flip.134 More recently, the Virginia Supreme 
Court removed trial judge James Michael Hull from office for determining parental custody 
rights for a Christmas holiday by flipping a coin.135 The Supreme Court rejected Judge Hull’s 
rationale that the probabilistic decision was an attempt to encourage the parents to resolve the 
dispute for themselves.136 Federal Judge Gregory Presnell similarly used randomization as “a 
new form of alternative dispute resolution” when he ordered two attorneys to resolve a 
deposition dispute by playing a game of rock, paper, scissors.137 
While many people are viscerally appalled by the notion of judges flipping coins to 
decide legal issues, coin flipping need not be a “meaningless ritual.” In particular contexts, there 
                                                 
132 523 U.S. 272, 288 (1998). 
133 Id. at 288; see also id. at 288 (“Judicial intervention might, for example, be warranted in the face of a scheme whereby a state 
official flipped a coin to determine whether to grant Clemency . . . .”).  
134 People v. Jones (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1982). 
135 Gary Slapper, Weird Cases: Justice by Coin-Toss, TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 16, 2007, 
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article2882090.ece. 
136 Id. 
137Adam Liptak, Lawyers Won’t End Squabble, so Judge Turns to Child’s Play, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/09/us/09judge.html?_r=1&oref=slogin; Jeralyn Merritt, The “Rock, Paper Scissors” Judge, 
TALKLEFT, June 9, 2006, available at http://www.talkleft.com/story/2006/06/09/305/45461. 
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are a variety of public policy rationales for randomized decisions. It’s not clear whether Judge 
Hull was sincere in claiming that his coin flipping over Christmas child custody was an attempt 
to promote private dispute resolution. But the rationale is not implausible. Indeed, one of us has 
shown that probabilistically dividing an entitlement by randomly giving it to one disputant or 
another can in fact promote private settlement.138 Disputants bargaining in the shadow of 
probabilistically divided, Solomonic rights have powerful incentives to speak more honestly with 
each other—and therefore may be more likely to settle a dispute before the actual coin flip,139 just 
as the lawyers in the deposition dispute resolved their dispute before having to play rock, paper, 
scissors on the courthouse steps. Moreover, in the context of child custody, Jon Elster has 
proffered an independent rationale for resolving custody disputes by coin flipping.140 Elster 
argues that probabilistically assigning custody in close cases is valuable because the state does 
not tell the child that one parent is marginally better than the other. For Elster, publicly stating 
that mom or dad is the marginally better Christmas custodian may not be in the best interest of 
the children.  
Judicial antipathy to randomized decisions is at its highest with regard to decision-
making in criminal cases. But even here, it is not difficult to conjure public policy rationales for 
coin-flipping sentences. It is elementary economics that probabilistically uncertain sentences will 
have a greater deterrence effect with regard to risk-averse defendants than certain sentences.141 
New York State might get a bigger bang for its incarceration buck if it followed Judge Jones and 
flipped coins for twenty- and thirty-day sentences instead of sentencing everyone to twenty-five 
days. 142 (This deterrence result is, however, reversed for risk-preferring criminals, and it is 
                                                 
138 Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 
1027 (1995). 
139 Solomonic entitlements have an “information forcing” effect on ex-ante bargaining because disputants no longer are simply 
buyers or sellers.  In traditional negotiations, sellers overstate their valuations and buyers understate their valuations, making it 
difficult to discover all instances of value-enhancing trade.  But in the shadow of randomized asset allocation, it is possible for a 
plaintiff to enter into two different kinds of settlement—one where he or she buys the defendant’s probabilistic entitlement and 
one where he or she sells his or her own probabilistic entitlement.  The offsetting incentives to overstate value as a seller and 
understate value as a buyer lead to more forthright and efficient negotiations.  Id.; see also PETER CRAMTON, ROBERT GIBBONS & 
PAUL KLEMPERER, DISSOLVING A PARTNERSHIP EFFICIENTLY (1987).   
140 JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATION OF RATIONALITY (1989). 
141 Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Public Law Enforcement and Criminal Law (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 9698, 2003).   
142Cf. David Lewis, The Punishment That Leaves Something to Chance, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 53, 58-62 (1999) (defending 
punishments where the severity is randomized, en route to justifying harsher penalties for those who by coincidence cause more 
harm). 
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troubling that Judge Jones before flipping did not inquire of the defendant if he was a betting 
man.)143 But to our minds an even stronger rationale for randomization—even with regard to 
criminal sentencing—is to learn. After centuries of experience, we still do not have definitive 
evidence on whether longer sentences rehabilitate or harden criminals.144 Justice O’Connor is 
appalled by the idea of clemency by chance, and randomness applied in a single case seems 
unlikely to produce useful information. There might, however, be value in randomly granting 
clemency and parole to inmates selected at random, to see if in fact they had a higher recidivism 
rate than those who were not selected. 
The informational rationale for randomization also acts as a principle for deciding when 
not to test and when to stop testing. We shouldn’t allow randomized tests of parachutes,145 
because we already have strong evidence that they are effective. And it is standard protocol to 
shut down medical trials early if it becomes clear that either the control or treatment therapy is 
superior.146 The case for randomized testing is at its strongest when the evidence is truly in 
equipoise about which of two policies is the best. It is convenient analytically to contrast extreme 
examples of knowledge (as in the parachute example) and ignorance (as in the concept of 
evidentiary equipoise). But in many cases, existing evidence does not compel the conclusion that 
either the treatment or the control is more likely to be effective.147 Indeed, even if we start in a 
position of evidentiary equipoise, as any randomized trial proceeds, the very process of learning 
destroys the equipoise and creates the vexing problem of partial information.148 Notwithstanding 
the supposed requirements of informed consent, medical trials routinely fail to give participants 
the best current information about the likely result of the trial.149 The reason for the failure is 
keep patients participating. Patient surveys indicate, unsurprisingly, that “[w]illingness to 
                                                 
143 Editorial, For Whom the Coin is Tossed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1982, at 24.  
144 Jeffrey R. Kling et al., Experimental Analysis of Neighborhood Effects, 73 ECONOMETRICA 83 (2007).   
145 See supra note 7.  
146 Sarah J.L. Edwards, R.J. Lilford & J. Hewison, The Ethics of Randomised Controlled Trials from the Perspectives of 
Patients, the Public, and Health Care Professionals, 317 BMJ 1209-12 (1998). 
147 Moreover, from an efficiency perspective, it is sometimes cost effective to test and eliminate low probability therapies that 
might teach us a lot. Supra note 43; Martin L. Weitzman, Optimal Search for the Best Alternative, 47 ECONOMETRICA 641 
(1979). 
148 R.J. Lilford & J. Jackson, Equipoise and the Ethics of Randomisation, 88 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 552 (1995). 
149 Sarah J.L. Edwards, R.J. Lilford & J. Hewison, The Ethics of Randomised Controlled Trials from the Perspectives of 
Patients, the Public, and Healthcare Professionals, 317 BMJ 1209 (1998) (“Most doctors expressed willingness to enter their 
patients in trials even when the treatments offered were widely available but were not an equal bet prospectively.”). 
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undergo randomisation drops as prospective participants are given more preliminary data and as 
they are made aware of any accumulating evidence of effectiveness.”150 
V. GUIDELINES AND APPLICATIONS 
We saw in Part III that even with the best statistical tools, it is often difficult to make 
inferences about causality from nonrandomized policy changes. Randomization makes 
interpretation much easier, though as we saw in Part IV, even randomized experiments can be 
difficult to interpret. Given these concerns, this Part develops some general guidelines for 
randomized experimentation (without repeating all the advice developed in the previous section), 
describes how legislatures and administrative agencies might initiate randomization studies, and 
offers some specific applications of randomizing law. 
A. General Guidelines 
In many respects, randomized experiments should conform to ordinary principles of 
experimentation. For example, there should be a large enough sample to generate meaningful 
results.151 There is no magic number for all experiments; a small number of observations may be 
enough if the measured effect of the intervention is anticipated to be large, but a large number 
may be needed for small anticipated measured effects. The higher the number of observations, 
the better chance that any actual effect will correctly be identified as existing at any particular 
threshold of statistical significance. Policymakers need not, however, choose any particular level 
of statistical significance, such as 0.05, as a threshold for identifying an experiment as a success. 
Statisticians have long recognized these thresholds as arbitrary.152  
Meanwhile, policymakers must consider the unit of analysis at which randomization 
occurs.153 If randomization is at the jurisdictional or institutional level, then even if there are 
many affected individuals or entities, the number of independent observations is the number of 
separately randomized units. Statistical analysis could be used to assess individual responses to 
                                                 
150 J. King & R. Nicholson, Informed Consent, 3 INST. MED. ETHICS BULL. 1 (1986).  
We might be more willing if we knew that the trial would increase our probability of getting the more effective therapy—but in 
this example, self-interested patients would prefer 100% of the therapy that is more likely to be effective.   
151 See, e.g., DUFLO ET AL., supra note 87, at 29 (discussing the issue of sample size in randomized experiments). 
152 See, e.g., Lester V. Manderscheid, Significance Levels, 0.05, 0.01, or ?, 47 J. FARM ECON. 1381 (1965) (urging that the 
applicable level of statistical significance be tailored to a particular purpose). 
153 See, e.g., DUFLO ET AL., supra note 87, at 40. 
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policies, but only at the risk of reintroducing omitted variable bias. Finally, policymakers should 
generally use matched samples, with matching occurring before the experiment on all available 
variables, to reduce attrition bias.  
A final, but more controversial, design suggestion is to avoid problems of self-selection 
and attrition by making participation mandatory. Social experiments to date have largely been 
opt-in, allowing individuals to choose whether to participate and then perhaps also whether to 
opt out.154 This is not surprising given the conventional view of social experimentation as a form 
of academic research. Academics cannot experiment on research subjects without informed 
consent.155 But governments in theory could make participation in a randomized experiment 
mandatory (just as it has done with the draft lotteries) and even institute reporting requirements. 
There will always be some people who ignore the rules, and some unavoidable attrition, due to 
factors like emigration and death. But a government could either not count such individuals (and 
their matches) or develop some other convention for how to count them.156  
After accounting for experimental implementation costs, which are fixed, the threshold 
for implementing an experiment should be lower than the threshold for enacting new policies. 
While policies apply to everyone indefinitely, the direct effects of experiments apply to a subset 
of the population for a discrete period of time. As a result, the “downside” of implementing an 
experimental policy is much lower than the downside of an ordinary policy, implying that the 
threshold for experimental policy implementation is lower than the threshold for permanent 
enactment. Moreover, the informational value of an experiment is higher than the informational 
value of ordinary policy enactment. Experiments allow for better identification of the causal 
effects of policies than ordinary policy changes. When the policy environment does not change 
radically over time, this information yields benefits over a long period. Randomized experiments 
thus provide uniquely accurate information with long-lasting value.  
A policy can be randomly assigned at many different levels of randomization. Some 
policies can be randomly assigned at the individual level. This level of randomization is familiar 
                                                 
154 Alice M. Rivlin & P. Michael Timpane, Introduction and Summary, in ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL 
EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 97, at 1, 7. 
155 See generally Kathryn A. Tuthill, Human Experimentation, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 221 (1997) (providing a legal overview). 
156 The convention might depend on context. For example, in an experiment on securities disclosure, the bankruptcy of a 
corporation could count as stock price declining to zero. An individual’s death might count as a bad result in a health care policy 
experiment, but simply be ignored in an experiment on fee shifting in court cases.  More generally, it is possible to estimate 
“intent to treat” effects that look at the impact of treatment offers or attempts, regardless of whether the subjects “comply.” 
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from the pharmaceutical industry. In a drug trial, some individual subjects are given the 
experimental drug, while other individuals serving as controls receive the drug that constitutes 
the existing state of the art. Similarly, individuals can be randomized into different policies. For 
example, Medicare’s Prescription drug program, “Part D,” randomly assigned more than six 
million people to one of up to twenty qualified state plans.157 Recipients were free to opt out, but 
the legal default for the individual was chosen at random. 
In other cases, randomization may take place at a different level of generality. It makes 
little sense, for example, to test some securities disclosure rules by randomly assigning 
individuals to different disclosure regimes. Instead, the policymaker would probably randomly 
assign firms to different disclosure regimes and observe how the different disclosure regimes 
affect firm outcomes. Alternatively, different jurisdictions might be assigned to different 
policies, with the same policy applying to each individual within a jurisdiction. If we wanted to 
examine the effect of different speed limits, for example, it would be theoretically possible to 
randomly assign every driver in the jurisdiction to a different speed limit and observe the 
outcome. But instead of giving each individual a different speed limit, policymakers could give 
different municipalities, counties, or states a different speed limit, with the limit applying to all 
individuals within the jurisdiction.  
So how should policymakers decide the appropriate level of randomization? We believe 
the appropriate level or randomization is the smallest scale that still leaves interactions between 
the treated and untreated groups at a minimum. More fine-grained units of randomization are 
generally preferred so long as we are theoretically confident that the policy treatment will not 
impact the untreated group. When a policy targets individual incentives and has no 
“externalities”—effects that extend beyond an individual—then the treatment should be 
randomly assigned at the individual level. For example, if (counterfactually) individual driving 
patterns did not affect others, then different speed limits should be randomly assigned to 
different individuals. Assigning speed limits to broader level jurisdictions under these conditions 
gains no benefit and limits the power of an experiment because it is much more costly to add 
observations.158 Thus, random assignment to individuals would be the best strategy when a 
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(2008).  
158 When policy is randomized at the state level, for example, serial correlation in error terms makes standard errors wide, and 
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policy targets individual outcomes and there are no spillovers to (untreated) other individuals. 
However, in this driving example, it is probable that randomized speed limits may affect the 
driving patterns of the untreated drivers. There might generally be more accidents for both 
treated and untreated drivers if they drive at different speeds on the same highway. Drivers in the 
control group might be induced to drive more aggressively if they witness subject group drivers 
going faster in response to higher speed limits. Because of the strong possibility of these types of 
spillovers between the treated and untreated groups, it would be more appropriate to randomize 
speed limits at the jurisdiction level.   
Randomization at the firm level is often the appropriate unit analysis when analyzing 
policies that are dominantly targeted toward affecting firm behavior. Accordingly, randomized 
tests of corporate and securities law should often be implemented by randomly treating 
individual firms. But analogous concerns about spillover effects on untreated firms apply here as 
well. If treated firms are required to comply with an inefficient rule,159 then we should expect 
untreated firms that need not comply with the rule would be placed at a competitive advantage. 
In equilibrium, we would expect the untreated firms to change their behavior: faced with weaker 
competitors, the untreated firms might increase their price or change the quality of their product. 
We might even see the advantaged untreated firms expand their market share and stock price 
because of “losing” the treatment lottery. At times, the treatment-induced shift in market share 
may be relevant to evaluating the legal treatment itself. But when the outcome of interest 
concerns dimensions of social welfare that are not fully felt by the firms and their customers, the 
impact of the treatment on the untreated firm’s behavior may undermine analysts’ ability to parse 
out the true causal mechanism. The presence of intra-industry competitive spillovers will often 
militate toward randomizing at the industry, instead of the firm, level.  
After choosing the experimental population, experimenters must choose the appropriate 
time period in which to conduct the experiment. Longer experimental periods offer some obvious 
advantages. Long periods increase the chance that all involved parties become aware of the 
experiment and reduce the ability of the parties to avoid experimental effects by delaying 
                                                                                                                                                             
therefore complicates the finding of statistically significant policy impacts. For details, see Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo & 
Sendhil Mullainathan, How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?, 119 Q. J. ECON. 249 (2004).  
159 Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. 
L. REV. 361, 372-85 (1991) (discussing market impact of efficient and inefficient mandates); see also Christine Jolls, 
Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223 (2000). 
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behavior until the experiment completes. Both factors mean that longer periods are more likely 
to provide better estimates of the true effects of an experimental policy than short periods. At the 
same time, however, long-term experiments exacerbate the inequalities created by 
experimentation. In addition, experimental policies will often prove to be failures. Lengthening 
the term of the experiment raises the cost of these failures. In total, the experimental period 
should be the shortest period necessary to obtain reasonably representative estimates of the true 
effects of the experimental policy.  
In some circumstances, the length of the experiment will be contingent on the interim 
results of the experiment itself. As in drug testing, if the interim results point to a clear 
conclusion, it may be appropriate to shut down the study earlier than expected.160 Once it 
becomes clear that one treatment is preferred to another, it is immoral and inefficient to 
capriciously expose subjects to the inferior policy. In other circumstances it will be appropriate 
to extend the length of the experiment to gather more information. This is especially true with 
regard to multi-level randomized testing, where follow-up testing of untested permutations may 
be warranted. Still, in other contexts it may be appropriate to continue the testing but to alter the 
probable assignments of the different policy treatments. Google AdWords provide a vivid 
example of this form of “convexification” with regard to Internet ads. If a randomized 
experiment initially suggests that “Tastes Great” is a more successful beer ad than “Less Filling,” 
the Google software will automatically start increasing the probability that people will see the 
more successful ad. This method—which is called “outcome-adaptive randomization”—
mitigates the inefficiency of additional testing, but allows the researcher to continue to collect 
some information on the longer-term effects of the various policy treatments.161  
B. Institution-Specific Guidelines 
The precise workings and advantages of randomized experimentation may differ greatly 
depending on whether a legislature or an administrative agency designs an experiment. 
Administrative law doctrine should tolerate the launch of randomized experiments, and once 
                                                 
160 For example, the National Institute of Health shut down a study of the impact of circumcision on HIV infection rates in 
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randomization becomes more common, an executive order might insist that agencies 
systematically consider what policies should be randomized. Meanwhile, in legislatures, there is 
a danger that even solid evidence produced by randomized experiments will be ignored, and this 
produces an argument for self-executing randomized experiments, where policy outcomes hinge 
directly on experimental results in a way specified in statutes. Agencies, by contrast, are less 
likely to simply ignore experimental results.  
1. Administrative Agencies: The Case for a Randomization Impact Statement 
Sometimes, as in the Medicare experiment, an agency may conduct an experiment as the 
result of a legislative decree, but it is also possible that agencies themselves could decide to 
randomize policies. The courts would presumably examine such a decision with the usual tools 
of administrative judicial review, ensuring for example that the action was procedurally 
proper,162 was consistent with law,163 and represented a permissible policy judgment.164 
These hurdles should be straightforward for an agency to clear. As long as an agency 
goes through the ordinary notice-and-comment process,165 providing a detailed explanation of the 
purpose of an experiment in the notice of proposed rulemaking,166 as well as a “concise, general 
statement” of basis and purpose,167 there should be no procedural obstacle to proceeding with an 
experiment that would change the law for certain entities. As long as neither the experimental 
nor the control legal regimes is inconsistent with the agency’s governing statute, a decision to 
launch an experiment should present no problem for Chevron review. Perhaps the most 
significant obstacle would be hard look review,168 in which a court would examine the agency’s 
                                                 
162 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (setting forth requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
163 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (setting forth the modern 
standard for evaluating agency legal interpretations). 
164 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (requiring the reviewing court to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found 
to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”). 
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Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (warning against interpreting these words literally). 
168 See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“Its supervisory function calls on the 
court to intervene . . . if the court becomes aware . . . that the agency has not really taken a ‘hard look’ at the salient problems, 
and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.”). 
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justification for creating the experiment. But hard look review is supposed to be deferential,169 
and an agency should be able to justify employing a randomized experiment on the ground that 
this approach could provide information relevant to the administrative process. 
Indeed, an administrative agency should perhaps receive broader latitude to create an 
experiment than to create a new administrative regime without an experiment. Procedurally, an 
agency might argue that it should not have to go through notice-and-comment to establish an 
experiment,170 because the experiment is merely designed to produce data from which to make a 
subsequent policy decision. Courts have been hesitant to allow agencies to avoid the notice-and-
comment process for temporary rules,171 perhaps in part because this would allow an 
administrative agency to renew a program indefinitely.172 An agency should, however, at least be 
allowed to focus solely on the reason for conducting an experiment, rather than responding to 
comments on the merits of the underlying policy issue. Because an experiment produces data on 
a policy issue, courts should not require an agency to show that existing data already justifies the 
policy that the experiment is designed to test.  
To enact an experimental policy permanently, an agency presumably would face hard 
look review, but here too the courts should perhaps be more deferential than usual. Critics of 
notice-and-comment have complained that it is “ossified,”173 making it too cumbersome to effect 
change. A response to this objection is that demanding review by the courts ensures that an 
agency does not pursue an idiosyncratic, ideological agenda.174 An agency conducting an 
                                                 
169 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“The 
scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the 
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170 This might be so when Congress has explicitly instructed an agency to conduct an experiment. Even here, however, the 
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Gas Pipeline v. FERC, 969 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
172 But see Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause Exemption to Notice and Comment Rulemaking Requirements Under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 317, 378 (1989) (suggesting that courts enforce temporary rules only until the 
agency has had enough time to develop a permanent rule, whether or not it has done so). 
173 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995). 
174 An ideological agency, facing an ideologically hostile court, might respond either by investing more in meeting the 
requirements of the hard look doctrine or “allocate their resources to other projects.” Richard L. Revesz, Environmental 
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experiment is less likely to be following an ideological agenda than an agency drawing 
inferences based on existing data that plausibly might support different conclusions. Moreover, 
courts conducting judicial review should recognize the unique value of evidence from 
randomized experimentation.175 There remains a danger that an agency might make invalid 
inferences on the basis of an experiment. At least where experiments provide the best available 
evidence on a policy issue, however, courts should allow an agency to reply that it placed more 
weight on the experimental evidence, without chronicling on a case-by-case basis all of the 
problems of nonexperimental evidence. 
If individual agency initiatives begin to test and choose policies with experimental 
means, randomization could gradually become a more entrenched part of the policy process. 
Perhaps someday, considering randomization might become almost as routine and formalized as 
cost-benefit analysis.176 For example, the executive branch might provide a standard procedure 
for agencies to consider randomization and to produce a randomization impact statement (RIS) 
when enacting a new rule, whether or not the agency decided to use a randomized approach.  
An RIS might include the following elements:  
1. The impetus for conducting a policy experiment. It will be particularly important to 
delineate the particular predicted outcomes or consequences that motivate the proposed change. 
If no experiment was conducted, an explanation of the experiment’s absence should be provided. 
Valid explanations for the absence of an experiment would include a de minimus exception, 
overwhelming evidence about the policy’s desirability, an urgent need for a new policy, or the 
impossibility of conducting a truly informative experiment. In some circumstances, it will prove 
difficult to quantitatively measure the information about the impacts of interest or to do so in a 
timely fashion. At other times, it will prove impossible to reach a consensus about how to weigh 
the importance of various impacts. For example, we imagine that a randomized experiment 
looking at the impact of a spousal notification requirement for abortion might do little (even if 
such a test were constitutionally permissible)177 to resolve the legislative debate, because 
legislators and their constituent groups may have incommensurable preferences.178 
                                                                                                                                                             
Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1770 (1997). 
175 Cf. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 2, at 397 (arguing that hard look review should reward experimental agency approaches, though 
not focusing specifically on random experimentation). 
176 See generally Executive Order No. 12866 § 1(b)(6) (1993) (permitting regulation only where benefits exceed costs). 
177 See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (striking down Pennsylvania spousal notification law).  
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 2. A detailed description of the experiment. The description should discuss the unit of 
randomization, the scope and length of the experiment, and the anticipated possible effects of the 
experimental policy on different outcome measures.  
3. A summary of the results of the experiment. The summary should reflect not just the 
agency’s examination of the data generated by the experiment, but also the analysis of other 
researchers. If there are differences of opinion regarding the outcomes of the experiment, the RIS 
should discuss reasons for the differences and explain why the agency prefers one conclusion 
about the causal effects of a policy rather than another.  
4. An explanation of why the results weigh in favor of adopting a new policy. The results 
of the experiment are simply data. The results provide information that informs policymaking, 
but they cannot specify how policymakers should prefer certain outcomes over others. 
Consequently, the RIS should explain why the causal impacts of the policy are desirable in light 
of the stated goals of the agency.  
An important question would be the role of the courts in reviewing randomization impact 
statements. Once again, no doctrinal innovation is necessary here, as the courts could assess 
randomization impact statements with the usual tools of hard look review, ensuring that agencies 
have carefully addressed counterarguments both to decisions whether to engage in randomization 
and in decisions after experimentation occurs. Creation of the randomization impact statement as 
an integral part of the administrative process would ensure that consideration of randomization 
by both agencies and courts would become a standard part of the policy process, rather than an 
occasional innovation pushed largely by academic researchers. 
The randomization impact statement could also provide an opportunity for the Office of 
Management and Budget or some other specialized agency to generate expertise in administering 
experiments that could then be applied to experiments from all agencies. Such an agency might 
even be given the general task of conducting all policy experiments and interpreting results. 
Running policy experiments requires specific skills, such as knowing what types of outcome 
                                                                                                                                                             
But a state might experiment on offering the possibility of giving couples at the time of marriage the option of contracting for 
spousal notification.  See Andrew Blair-Stanek, Comment, Default and Choices in the Marriage Contract: How to Increase 
Autonomy, Encourage Discussion, and Circumvent Constitutional Constraints, 24 TOURO L. REV. 31 (2008). 
178   Then again, some moderate legislators might be swayed by compelling evidence about the impact of notification law on: i) 
a women’s propensity to abort; ii) the propensity of unaborted fetuses to commit crime; and iii) the probable psychological well-
being of the spouses.  See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and 
Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein & Justin Wolfers, Op-Ed., A Death Penalty Puzzle: The 
Murky Evidence for and Against Deterrence, WASH. POST, June 30, 2008, at A11.  
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information are readily obtainable and limiting dropout rates in the subject and control 
populations. Many of these skills apply regardless of the subject of the policy experiment and 
there is likely to be considerable learning by doing. Just as pharmaceutical companies hire 
clinical trial companies to run drug trials, so too should policymaking bodies use experimental 
trial specialists.179  
2. Legislatures: The Case for Self Execution 
Given the problems identified in Part IV, random experimentation data will rarely give 
unambiguous answers to multi-dimensional policy questions. The results of random 
experimentation will become additional pieces of information available to decisionmakers, and 
there is little reason to expect that the influence of information will be proportional to its 
quality.180 But experiments could have greater impact if legislatures were to make policy 
conditional on experimental results, that is if experiments were self-executing. A self-executing 
experiment either could specify ex ante the policy effects of particular results, or, as in the 
Medicare experiment, could require independent decisionmakers in an administrative agency to 
make policy changes based on the experiment. The hope is to nudge policy at least a small 
distance in what will generally be the right direction while avoiding some of the public choice 
hurdles and legislative inertia that often frustrate change. 
A self-executing experiment, of course, would still require legislative authorization, and 
so it cannot avoid these obstacles altogether. But if through gradual steps randomized self-
executing experiments become sufficiently familiar that they no longer seem strange, then a 
culture of random legal experimentation might slowly emerge. Legal experiments should be 
easier to enact in this culture than are legal reforms in our present legal culture. A marginal 
decisionmaker, uncertain whether to support a program, should be more willing to favor it when 
the program will continue if and only if it turns out to be successful. Supporters of a program, 
meanwhile, may find it difficult to oppose a measure that would condition continuation of the 
program on confirmation of its success. Even opponents of moving the law in the direction of an 
                                                 
179 One prominent clinical trial company has run over “3,200 trials in some 50 countries” since the year 2000. See Working with 
Quintiles, http://www.quintiles.com/AboutUs/WorkingWithQ.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2008). 
180 See infra Part III.A.1. 
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experiment might nonetheless be willing to support the experiment if they believe that it will turn 
out to be a failure.  
These effects may be sufficient to promote experimentation on the margins even in 
today’s legal culture, but in a mature legal experimental culture, norms could emerge that could 
further facilitate experimentation and legal change. We can imagine, for example, bidirectional 
self-executing experiments, which would move the law automatically in the direction of the 
experiment if it proves successful, and in the opposite direction if it fails. If ideological 
opponents genuinely disagree about the effects of potential policies, such experiments can seem 
beneficial ex ante to all, increasing the gains from political trade. Such experiments channel 
ideological disagreement, increasing the possibility of legal change rather than hardening 
impasse. Such experiments seem unlikely in our current legal system, but growing comfort with 
experimentation, randomization, and self-execution might someday make it so that opposition to 
such an experiment would be perceived as indicating that a policymaker lacked confidence in 
empirical claims advanced on behalf of a proposal. 
The principal challenge of self-execution is determination of what counts as success. The 
metrics they agree on may well be simple proxies, far less sophisticated than what statisticians ex 
post would rely on. For example, success might depend on a comparison of a single variable, or 
perhaps two or three variables, between the treatment and control group. In theory, policymakers 
might agree in advance on regression designs and a formula aggregating regression coefficients 
or other results to create nuanced self-executing experiments. But it is difficult to conceive in 
advance of all the regression tests that would be necessary to verify robustness. Any formula is 
likely to be somewhat arbitrary and difficult to understand. Even if social scientists might feel 
more comfortable scrutinizing many nonrandom experiments than blindly following an ex ante 
specification of a measurement to be taken from a random experiment, relying on simple proxies 
for determining the success of randomized self-executing experiments may be politically more 
feasible. 
Self-executing experiments will resolve policy debates based on simplified proxies for 
policy. If a simplified experiment is likely to produce better policy than a more elaborate one, 
that should be sufficient justification. Policymakers have no moral obligation to increase the 
quantity of societal knowledge at the expense of policy. Admittedly, if the proxy ex ante seems 
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likely to be so poor that policy will effectively be moving in a random direction, then the case for 
self-execution is weak. Similarly, if the policy process improves so that it more effectively 
assimilates expert opinion, more complex experimental designs may be preferable. Even so, self-
execution could do little harm, shifting the policy baseline but still permitting policymakers to 
make changes if subtle experimental results justified them. 
This highlights that we cannot consider legal experiments solely as a social scientist 
might. Rather, we must consider legal experimentation as a mechanism of the policymaking 
process, an imperfect device for converting scientific knowledge into law. Sometimes, the 
criteria of scientific usefulness and legal practicality point in different directions. An experiment 
might be beneficial even if its results add little to social science knowledge; a simple 
randomization scheme may be beneficial even where econometricians would prefer a more 
elaborate treatment design; and an experiment might compare two legal approaches varying 
along a number of dimensions even though this may make the results difficult to interpret. In 
general, simple designs will be preferable to more complex and sophisticated ones when there is 
a danger either that the relevant officials will be unable to agree on the policy significance of a 
randomized experiment of that even if some authoritative decisionmaker could reach a 
resolution, that decisionmaker might be biased, for example in favor of the executive’s policy 
preferences. 
C. Applications 
To demonstrate the generality of such experiments, in this section we develop policy 
experiment applications to different fields of law and policy, focusing on some fields that have 
not been considered as candidates for randomized experimentation in the past. We begin with a 
detailed examination of an actual randomized securities law experiment and propose extending 
the same approach to test the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We then consider the possibility of a 
randomized test in the area of taxation. 
1. Securities Law 
Securities law is ideally situated for randomized policy experiments. Much of securities 
law applies at a national level. As a result, there is little interstate variation in securities law that 
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scholars can apply to test different approaches to securities regulation.181 Moreover, many topics 
in securities regulation, such as the desirability of short-selling or the appropriate degree of 
required disclosure, are the subject of long-standing, but still hotly contested, debates.182 
Securities regulation is characterized by intense theoretical debates informed by scant empirical 
evidence. Systematic randomized policy experiments offer the prospect of providing important 
new data to many of these long-standing theoretical debates.  
a) A Short Sale Experiment 
Policymakers recently have begun to grasp the potential of randomized policy 
experiments for securities. In 2004, the SEC issued Rule 202T of Regulation SHO, devising an 
experiment to test some restrictions on short sales. 183 Scholars have debated the effect of these 
restrictions. Finance theory predicts that short sale restrictions should reduce the volume of short 
selling, which in turn should reduce the liquidity of a stock and potentially lead to less accurate 
pricing.184 Others argue that the restrictions help prevent stock manipulation by coordinated short 
sellers seeking to force the price of a stock down simply to purchase it a low price. 
Rule 202T allowed the SEC to implement a “pilot program to examine the efficacy” of 
the short sale restrictions.185 The pilot program exempted one third of the stocks in the Russell 
3000 from the short sale restrictions. The exempted stocks were chosen by sorting the 2004 
Russell 3000 first by listing market [e.g., NYSE, NASDAQ], then by average daily dollar 
volume from June 2003 through May 2004, and then selecting every third company starting with 
the second. This is an example of stratified sampling.186 So long as it is effectively random which 
                                                 
181 The lack of interstate variation explains the intense empirical interest in the relatively infrequent change in securities laws at 
the national level. For example, the 1930s, when modern securities law was first introduced, continue to be an active area of 
research, as is an expansion of the securities law regime to over-the-counter (OTC) stocks in the 1960s. Michael Greenstone, Paul 
Oyer & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments, 121 Q.J. 
ECON. 399 (2006); Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2001); Allen 
Ferrell, Mandated Disclosure and Stock Returns: Evidence from the Over-the-Counter Market (Harvard Law & Economics 
Discussion Paper No. 453, 2003). 
182 Stephen E. Christophe, Michael G. Ferri & James J. Angel, Short-Selling Prior to Earnings Announcements, 59 J. FIN. 1845 
(2004); Ian Ramsay, Short-Selling: Further Issues, 21 SEC. REG. L.J. 214 (1993). 
183 OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE SHORT SALE PRICE RESTRICTIONS 
UNDER THE REGULATION SHO PILOT 3 (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2007/regshopilot020607.pdf 
(hereinafter “SEC Report”) (describing the restrictions). 
184 Id. at 6-8. 
185 Id. at 4.  
186 Stratified sampling occurs because: 
in any randomized trial it is desirable that the comparison groups should be as similar as possible as regards participant 
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of three companies with similar daily trading volumes happens to get exempted from the 
restrictions, the selection mechanism is equivalent to a stratified randomized experiment. Note 
that this experimental design did not seek volunteer companies for different regimes. Instead, the 
SEC simply chose some companies that would be exempted from the current short sale 
restrictions.  
The exempted stocks and other stocks in the Russell 3000 operated under different 
trading regimes from May 2005 to August 2007, providing a significant period for observing the 
effects of the short sale restrictions relative to eliminating the restrictions. 187 The Office of 
Economic Analysis of the SEC produced a comprehensive report on the pilot program, with 
many of the components that we recommend for the RIS. The report first reviews the theoretical 
and empirical literature on short sale restrictions. This literature tends to view the existing policy 
of short sale restrictions as inefficient. The report explains that the pilot program was enacted “to 
obtain empirical data to help assess whether short sale regulation should be removed, in part or 
in whole, for actively-traded securities, or if retained, should be applied to additional 
securities.”188 The report also provides detailed descriptions of the possible effects of short sale 
restrictions on a wide variety of outcomes, such as short selling volume, the amount of 
“synthetic” short sales in the option markets or via trading platforms, liquidity, pricing levels, 
and pricing volatility.189 
The report then provides a detailed explanation of how the experiment was conducted, 
with a discussion and justification of the stratified sampling method used in the experiment.190 In 
addition, the report explains the methodological tools applied to examine the impact of the short 
sales restrictions on various outcomes.191 Finally, the report provides a detailed examination of 
                                                                                                                                                             
characteristics that might influence the response to the intervention. Stratified randomization is used to ensure that 
equal numbers of participants with a characteristic thought to affect prognosis or response to the  intervention will be 
allocated to each comparison group . . . . Stratified randomization is performed either by performing separate 
randomization (often using random permuted blocks) for each strata, or by  using minimization. 
Stratified Randomization, Evidence-Based Medicine, Glossary of Terms, http://www.sahealthinfo.org/evidence/s.htm (last 
visited Sept. 5, 2008). If trading volume influences the effect of short sale restrictions, then the pilot design insured that the 
exempt group of stocks and the control group were similar by performing separate selections for each group of three stocks with 
similar daily trading volume. 
187 SEC Report, supra note 183, at 4. 
188 Id. at 4.  
189 Id. at 6-10. 
190 Id. at 22-28. 
191 Id. at 28-34. 
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the impact of the short sale restrictions on the outcomes of interest—including short selling 
volumes, bid-ask spreads, and use of short sale substitutes, such as put options.192 The report 
examines each outcome variable of interest, and finds that eliminating short sale restrictions 
impacts some outcome variables (such as short selling volumes, which are approximately 8% 
less with the restrictions than without), but has no effect on others (there are no differences in 
bid-ask spreads with or without the restrictions).193 The report also describes other studies of the 
pilot program’s experimental elimination of short sale requirements and discusses differences in 
estimated effects between the SEC’s study and the other academic studies.194 The report 
concludes that: 
In summary, having examined the impact of the Regulation SHO Pilot on a wide 
array of market characteristics, we conclude that price restrictions constitute an 
economically relevant constraint on short selling. Our evidence suggests that 
removing price restrictions for the pilot stocks has had an effect on the mechanics of 
short selling, order routing decisions, displayed depth, and intraday volatility, but on 
balance has not had a deleterious impact on market quality or liquidity. 
The report does not go beyond these conclusions to suggest policy changes in response to the 
experiment, although any subsequent attempt to change short sale restrictions is likely to discuss 
the pilot program in detail. 
In total, the nearly-randomized elimination of short sale restrictions for a third of the 
firms in the Russell 3000 highlights the value of experiments for policymaking. The experiment 
demonstrated that the short sale restrictions have some effects in the predicted direction, such as 
a reduction in short selling volume, but that it is unlikely that elimination of the restrictions 
would have a dramatic effect on market efficiency. Such sober conclusions suggest that 
experiments do not always lead to dramatic outcomes.  On the one hand, advocates of repeal can 
argue that the short sale restriction reduces freedom without any demonstrable improvement in 
market efficiency. Increasing individual freedom without hurting others presents a strong case 
for repeal. On the other hand, advocates of the status quo can argue that some of the benefits of 
the restriction—particularly the possibility of stabilizing the market during a price meltdown—
were not amenable to easy testing. Moreover, the costs of the restrictions are small. There is no 
                                                 
192 Id. at 34-51. 
193 Id. at 51-56; see also id. tbls. 3 & 6.  
194 See id. Appendix A.  
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systematic effect of the restriction on bid-ask spreads. With relatively low costs and untested 
benefits, proponents of the short sale restriction can argue that the case for repeal has not been 
made. At a minimum, the existence of the randomized test results makes some of the more 
strident arguments for and against repeal of the short selling restrictions less plausible. 
The quality of the experimental short sale restriction elimination and its accompanying 
report raises an obvious question. Given how valuable the experiment appears to be and how 
efficiently it was conducted, why does the SEC not apply its experimental expertise 
systematically to other debates in securities regulation? The next section proposes such an 
experiment in one area—the Sarbanes-Oxley law, but experiments can apply to any controversial 
issue. 
b) Experimental Sarbanes-Oxley Repeal 
In the wake of the Enron/WorldCom accounting scandals in 2002, Congress passed the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). SOX included many provisions to improve the quality of financial 
reporting and corporate governance. Some of SOX’s prominent provisions include mandatory 
CEO and CFO certification of financial results and new “internal controls” requirements.195  
SOX has proven quite controversial. Many corporations and academics dispute SOX’s 
efficacy in preventing fraud, while bemoaning its expense. Others argue that SOX performs a 
critical role in improving confidence in financial markets. This debate has spawned an extensive 
empirical literature evaluating SOX’s impacts on corporate value, cross listing in the U.S. 
markets, and going-private decisions.196 Many empirical papers find that SOX appears to destroy 
value or reduce cross listings, but these findings are disputed by others.  
The ambiguity about SOX’s desirability is reflected in calls for SOX’s elimination. To 
this point, however, SOX’s proponents have managed to prevent any alteration of SOX. SOX 
offers an almost ideal context for a randomized repeal of securities legislation. SOX’s provisions 
may well destroy value, but the existing empirical evidence is difficult to interpret because of 
confounding factors that plague the studies. For example, foreign company cross listings in U.S. 
                                                 
195 The internal controls requirements obligated companies to set up elaborate mechanisms for detecting malfeasance within the 
company or disclose the absence of such controls.  
196 Peter Iliev, The Effect of SOX Section 404: Costs, Earnings Quality and Stock Prices, 65 J. FIN, 1163(2010); see also Ellen 
Engel, Rachel M. Hayes & Xue Wang, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms’ Going-Private Decisions, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 116 
(2007); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005); 
Ivy Xiying Zhang, Economic Consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 74 (2007). 
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markets may have declined because of SOX’s onerous requirements, or they may have declined 
due to the development of foreign exchange’s sophistication, decreasing the value of U.S. 
markets as a source of capital. An experimental repeal of SOX for some companies is likely to 
provide convincing empirical evidence that resolves which of these factors is more important. 
Moreover, because SOX is so unpopular with corporations, instituting an experimental repeal 
should prove popular, while avoiding the political battle that would be caused by attempting to 
permanently repeal SOX for all companies.  
Randomized experimental repeal of SOX should take place as follows. First, the most 
controversial provisions of SOX should be identified. These are likely to include the internal 
control provisions and the CEO and CFO certification provisions. These provisions should then 
be randomly repealed for some corporations. The randomization should be stratified to ensure 
that different types of companies are appropriately represented in both the treatment group (with 
the SOX restrictions repealed) and control groups (with SOX continuing as presently). For 
example, foreign companies cross listed in U.S. markets should be well represented in both the 
sample and control groups to help evaluate SOX’s effect on delisting from U.S. markets. The 
experimental repeal period should be a relatively long one. Many of SOX’s effects will only be 
felt gradually. Corporate fraud, for example, does not occur overnight. In addition, once a plan 
for internal controls has been disbanded, it requires significant time and expense to restart it. In 
response, companies subject to experimental repeal will not scrap or revise their costly internal 
control mechanisms unless they can be confident that they will not have to reinstate the 
mechanisms shortly thereafter. As a result, a short-term experimental SOX repeal will not 
provide a good test of SOX’s true effects.197 Instead, the experimental repeal should be applied 
for an extended period—up to several years.198  
Just as in the short sale experiment, the unit of observation for an experimental Sarbanes-
Oxley repeal should be the publicly traded company. Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirements apply to 
                                                 
197 Because market values incorporate expectations of future profits, market values respond very quickly to the impact of new 
policies. The magnitude of the response to a new policy, however, will depend upon the policy’s duration as well as the policy’s 
expected impact. A short-term experimental repeal of SOX may therefore have a small (and potentially indistinguishable) effect 
on corporate value, because the experiment will not take place over a long enough period to have an important effect on long-
term profitability. Moreover, market responses, even if correct in expectation, may prove wrong in reality. A longer-term 
experiment allows the researchers to determine actual effects, rather than simply anticipated effects.  
198 While this might appear to be a long period, the status quo, with a controversial law applied indefinitely, is in many ways just 
as speculative as an experiment, but without producing information that would yield policy conclusions.   
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publicly traded corporations, making the choice of unit of observation relatively straightforward. 
If SOX repeal is likely to produce substantial competitive advantages for untreated firms (i.e., 
those still subject to SOX requirements),199 then the unit of randomization may need to be raised 
to the industry level. Even the possibility of being put at a competitive disadvantage might make 
industry randomization politically more palatable. 
The randomization should occur on each controversial issue within SOX rather than on 
SOX as a whole. Thus, some companies would have the internal control provisions eliminated, 
but other provisions of SOX would remain intact. Others would have only the CEO and CFO 
certification provisions eliminated. Still others would have both these provisions eliminated but 
the rest of SOX intact, and so on. Randomizing different permutations of the controversial 
provisions in SOX allows for the identification of specific provisions that are effective or 
ineffective, rather than the law as a whole. In addition, observing the effects of different 
permutations allows policymakers to see if there are any interaction effects between the two 
provisions.200 
 Because many companies find SOX compliance costly and are likely to volunteer, a test 
of SOX could ask for companies to volunteer to participate in a SOX repeal experiment and then 
assign some of these companies to a treatment SOX-repeal group and others to a control group 
with SOX remaining in place.201 The experiment with volunteer companies would provide a good 
estimate of the treatment effect of allowing companies to opt out of SOX, because companies 
that volunteer to take part in an experimental repeal of SOX are likely to be similar to companies 
                                                 
199 For example, suppose that investors benefit from the improvement in information quality mandated by SOX, but that 
investors can apply this information from companies subject to SOX to companies not subject to SOX. In this case, the non-SOX 
companies may do better than the SOX companies because they get the benefit of the improved information without incurring its 
expense. This difference in outcomes, however, does not provide an accurate estimate of the impacts of a full SOX repeal. If no 
companies followed SOX, then there would be no informational spillovers and all companies might be worse off.  An experiment 
which is partially randomized at the industry level and partially randomized at the firm level could parse out the extent to which 
there were intra-industry spillovers of this kind.   
200 An interaction effect occurs when the effect of one variable is dependent upon the value of another variable. For example, 
CEO certification provisions taken alone might have no impact on corporate value. Similarly, internal control requirements taken 
alone may also have no impact on value. When the two provisions are implemented together, however, they may have mutually 
reinforcing effects so that the combination of the two provisions has an impact on value.  
201 Repealing SOX for all companies that volunteer for the SOX repeal experiment and estimating the impact of SOX by 
comparing these companies with companies that did not volunteer for the experiment (for whom SOX remained in place) fails to 
provide accurate estimates of the impact of SOX. Companies that volunteer for SOX repeal may be different in unobservable 
ways from companies that do no volunteer. Any differences in outcomes for the two groups may therefore be attributable to these 
unobserved differences rather than to the repeal of SOX. As a result, some companies that volunteer for SOX repeal should be 
randomly assigned to a control group that must remain SOX compliant. These companies will be similar to the companies that 
volunteered for a SOX repeal and had SOX repealed, making estimates of the effect of a SOX repeal more accurate. 
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that would opt out of SOX, were that an option. Examining an experiment with volunteers would 
provide a poor estimate of the impact of a full repeal of SOX, however, because the impact of 
SOX on companies that volunteer to have SOX eliminated is likely to be different from the 
impact of SOX on the average company.202 
To estimate the impact of a full SOX repeal on the average company, SOX repeal could 
be randomly but mandatorily assigned to some companies but not others. This would incur the 
cost of forcing some companies to experience SOX repeal unwillingly, but avoids the problem of 
estimating the impact of SOX exclusively for companies that volunteer to have SOX repealed. A 
randomized mandatory repeal of SOX for some companies but not for others is no different than 
the randomly assigned repeal of short-sale restrictions undertaken in the Regulation SHO pilot. 
An intermediate strategy would be to randomize all companies except those that decide to opt 
out of the experiment, ensuring that failure to act is not interpreted as unwillingness to participate 
in the experiment. 
There are many potential outcomes of interest for a SOX-randomized experiment. SOX 
aimed to restore investor confidence in the financial markets and financial reporting. One 
obvious outcome variable is therefore investor confidence in the quality of corporate reporting. A 
related measure would include the amount of fraud in SOX companies relative to non-SOX 
companies. To financial economists, however, confidence and prevention of fraud are not aims 
but rather means to an end. Investor confidence should reduce the cost of equity and debt 
financing, thereby enabling more investment in positive-net-present-value activities. Moreover, 
measures of investor confidence or fraud prevention fail to account for the cost of SOX 
compliance. Therefore, other measures that account for both the costs and benefits of SOX 
should be examined.  
One important alternative measure of SOX’s efficacy is stock market value. Stock market 
value goes up if investors perceive that SOX reduces the cost of capital and costs nothing, but 
goes down if SOX raises costs without benefits. The stock market response to the announcement 
of the randomization status of each company will therefore provide a good estimate of the 
market’s impression of SOX’s net effects. Because of the randomized nature of a SOX 
experiment and the large number of companies that would participate, a long term study of the 
                                                 
202  See supra note 119. 
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impact of SOX on market value is possible, providing evidence not just of the market’s 
impressions of SOX, but also of the market’s verdict after observing SOX’s impacts. If, after a 
number of years, SOX companies have outperformed non-SOX companies, then this constitutes 
solid evidence that SOX enhances corporate value.  
If a SOX experiment is to be self-executing, simple comparisons of stock market values 
for treated and control corporations may be the best basis for determining whether particular 
features of the SOX repeal should be retained. The case for self-execution is particularly strong if 
it appears likely that Congress otherwise might well ignore the experiment, with partisans 
sticking to their original positions regardless of the experimental results. Even a perfect 
experiment will not resolve all questions about SOX t, for example because partisans of one 
position or another might argue reasonably that the result could have been different if the 
experiment lasted longer. It might seem that an experiment’s imperfection furnishes an argument 
against self-execution, on the ground that policy changes should depend on ex post expert 
analysis. Arguably, though, imperfection furnishes an argument for self-execution, if a proxy 
result is still meaningful and legislators seem likely to have sticky priors. An imperfect proxy 
may be more likely to produce beneficial legislative change than careful analysis if legislators 
seem unlikely to be swayed by such analysis. In any event, self-execution would merely change 
the policy baseline; Congress could still act based on a nuanced interpretation of the experiment.  
In addition to running tests on SOX, the SEC can run analogous experiments that 
investigate other contentious issues in securities law, such as whether mandatory disclosure or 
insider trading prohibitions enhance corporate value, or merely add costs. Such experiments 
should follow the format suggested here for SOX, which in turn is very similar to the 
experimental short sale restriction study already run by the SEC.  
2. Tax Law 
Few topics in public policy are as hotly debated as the impact of different tax rates on 
incentives to work. Some economists argue that small changes in marginal tax rates can have 
large effects on work hours and entrepreneurship. As a result, they claim that lowering marginal 
tax rates does not reduce government revenues as much as one might predict.203 Others argue that 
                                                 
203 If a change in tax rates has no impact on behavior, then the revenue loss can be estimated by the decrease in the tax rate. 
Most economists, however, think that a change in the tax rate has some effect on the supply of labor and entrepeneurship. Some 
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hours and entrepreneurship are not particularly sensitive to relatively small changes in marginal 
tax rates, meaning that government revenues will fall nearly proportionately to the amount of a 
tax decrease. These arguments are rehashed whenever the government considers raising or 
lowering taxes (in other words, almost annually).204 
Tax rates change frequently, so there is ample variation with which to study how the 
change in tax rates impacts labor supply and entrepreneurship.205 Unfortunately, these changes in 
rates are often correlated with many other things, making it extremely difficult to draw firm 
conclusions about the response of labor supply to tax rates. For example, tax rates are often 
altered in response to changes in economic conditions.206 If economic behavior changes after 
rates change, the changes may be attributable to the change in rates, or it may be attributable to 
the changing economic conditions that motivated the change in rates. Such confounding factors 
help explain the lack of consensus about the true impact of taxes on labor supply incentives.207 
Randomized experimental manipulation of tax rates will not suffer from this 
complication. If tax rates are randomized at the individual level, then individuals facing very 
similar economic conditions will be subject to different tax rates. If these individuals behave 
differently, then the differences are much more likely to be caused by the differential tax rates 
rather than confounding factors. Take, for example, two individuals of similar educational 
backgrounds and work histories, but subject to different marginal tax rates. If the individual 
subject to the lower tax rates works many more hours than her counterpart subject to higher tax 
rates, then this provides compelling evidence that high marginal tax rates significantly reduce 
labor supply. We therefore recommend a randomized experiment of marginal tax rates. 
The unit of observation in this experiment should be the individual or household.208 The 
critical outcomes of interest in the tax debate is the impact of tax rates on labor supply and 
                                                                                                                                                             
economists even claim that lowering tax rates can increase revenue, but this claim is discredited. N. Gregory Mankiw, The 
Optimal Collection of Seigniorage Theory and Evidence, 20 J. MONETARY ECON. 327 (2004).  
204 David Rosenbaum, Economic View: Name That Tune About Tax Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2003, at 3; Glenn Kessler, Now 
President Faces Tax Cut Test; Loss of Revenue Means Bush Needs to Cut Spending, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2001, at A5. 
205 See, e.g., DANIEL J. MITCHELL, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, LOWERING MARGINAL TAX RATES: THE KEY TO PRO-GROWTH 
TAX RELIEF (2001), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/taxes/BG1443.cfm; Basil Dalamagas, The Effects of Tax Rate 
Changes on Output and Government Deficits, 10 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 97 (2003). 
206 See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, Bush and House in Accord for $150 Billion Stimulus, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2008, at A1 
(describing 2008 tax rebate).  
207 Again, this is not meant to imply that there is no scholarly consensus on the impact of taxes on labor supply. The notion that 
tax cuts increase revenue (the Laffer curve), for example, would be rejected by the vast majority of serious scholars.  
208 Note that by varying the unit of randomization between the individual and the household, policymakers can get a sense of the 
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entrepreneurship. These decisions are made at the individual or household level, meaning that 
individuals or households are the appropriate units of observation.209 
Imposing differential mandatory tax rates on similarly situated individuals might be 
controversial. One response would be to make it explicit that the government is sponsoring a 
lottery, the winners of which will receive a reduction in their tax rates. Only individuals who 
filed a tax return in the prior year (or perhaps only those who timely filed) might be deemed 
eligible for the lottery.210 State-sponsored lotteries are common, and providing a prize for a 
fraction of those who meet a legal requirement might not seem objectionable. Even if only 
0.01% of taxpayers were selected for the lottery, that would provide a relatively representative 
sample of over 10,000 taxpayers. 
Alternatively, the government could randomly assign different mandatory marginal tax 
rates to individuals, but then provide fixed lump sum transfers to those individuals who receive 
higher tax rates so that average tax rates remain similar across individuals. There are several 
difficulties to this scheme, however. There will remain some differences in treatment, as the true 
average tax rate will depend on individual labor supply decisions, and these decisions will be 
differentially affected by different tax rates. In addition, an experiment that randomly assigns 
marginal tax rates and lump sum transfers does not provide unambiguous estimates of the impact 
of different marginal tax rates. Instead, the experiment provides estimates of the impacts of 
differential marginal tax rates and offsetting transfers. If transfers also have an effect on labor 
supply—such as a wealth effect211—then the experiment fails in its aim to provide conclusive 
evidence about the impact of marginal tax rates on labor supply and entrepreneurship. 
As with securities law experiments, a brief marginal tax rate experiment is unlikely to 
provide an unbiased estimate of the effect of different marginal tax rates. If tax rates change for a 
brief time, individuals subject to low tax rates may shift work from future periods into the 
                                                                                                                                                             
true effect of the “marriage penalty,” James Alm, Stacy Dickert-Conlin & Leslie A. Whittington, Policy Watch: The Marriage 
Penalty, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1999), and other important questions of tax policy.  
209 If policymakers want to study the spillover effects of taxes, such as whether lower taxes on the rich “trickle down” to the 
lower and middle classes, then policymakers can examine the behavior of each wealthy individual in greater detail. For example, 
if lower tax rates lead to greater entrepreneurship, then policymakers should examine the startup businesses founded by those 
with lower tax rates and estimate the identity and salaries of employees of the startup business. If this proves impossible, then tax 
rates can be randomized at other units of observation, such as the state or county.   
210 Credit for the idea of a state-sponsored lottery for individuals who meet tax law requirements belongs to Terrence Chorvat. 
211 Alan B. Krueger & Jorn-Steffen Pishke, The Effect of Social Security on Labor Supply: A Cohort Analysis of the Notch 
Generation, 10 J. LABOR ECON. 412 (1992).   
RANDOMIZING LAW 
 
60 
current period in order to take advantage of the lower tax rate. If people do this, the experiment 
will generate an unrealistically high estimate of the impact of tax rates on labor supply; the 
experiment will reflect abilities to shift work between time periods rather than to permanently 
adopt different labor arrangements in response to different incentives. A longer experimental 
period limits the ability of individuals to shift work between periods. Work can be moved from 
week to week, but it is much more difficult to move work from one year to another. As a result, 
the taxation experiment should take place over a relatively long period of time (e.g., two to three 
years), and outcome variables should be measured for at least a year after the conclusion of the 
experimental manipulation. 
There are many outcome variables of interest for a randomized experimental study of 
different marginal tax rates. The most obvious outcome variable is labor supply and wages. The 
experiment will directly address the degree to which lower taxes induce individuals to work 
more hours or seek more demanding higher wage jobs. Many other outcome variables, such as 
entreprenuership levels, child care decisions, and unemployment rates, should also be examined. 
One of these outcome variables, or some weighted combination of them, might be selected as the 
target of a self-executing experiment, in which the result would be either slightly lower or 
slightly higher taxes for the population at large. This may be particularly attractive if Democrats 
and Republicans on average genuinely have different empirical views about the effects of 
marginal tax rates. A self-executing experiment might leave each side optimistic that it will 
prevail, and it may be the only way to effect change if partisans on the losing side can be 
expected to conjure some explanation for losing instead of changing their views on taxes. 
3. Civil Rights 
Up to this point, most of our examples have concerned experiments concerning corporate 
or public finance. But the idea of randomized testing could be applied to a much larger set of 
laws that more directly concern the regulation of individual behavior. This section sketches how 
a randomized experiment could inform legislative choice concerning civil rights. At the moment, 
there is no federal law prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of sexual 
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orientation.212 The Employment Non-discrimination Act (ENDA)—a minimalist prohibition of 
disparate treatment on the basis of sexual orientation—has been introduced in Congress several 
times, recently passing in the House in 2007.213 Even though polls suggest that an overwhelming 
majority of Americans oppose employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,214 
opponents argue that ENDA would impose substantial litigation and other compliance costs that 
would be visited on private employers.215 
A 2000 GAO study sheds some light on the question of litigation costs by analyzing the 
number of claims that had been made in the eleven states that had prohibited sexual orientation 
discrimination by private employers as a matter of state law.216 One of us analyzed the claims 
data together with more general employment data and found that historically each year there has 
only been about one claim for every 60,000 workers.217 If the employer’s average cost per 
complaint were $100,000, the average annual cost of the statute per employee would be less than 
$2.218 
While this analysis of historic data suggests that employer costs are quite low, there is a 
chance that these estimates might not represent the costs that a federal law would produce. For 
example, it is possible that employers in the first eleven states to pass the law are less likely to 
discriminate than those in the remaining thirty-nine. Or it might be possible that the specific 
language of ENDA would produce lower (or higher) costs of compliance than the state statutes. 
A randomized test of the impact of ENDA is a natural and powerful way to learn more about 
                                                 
212 Twenty states and the District of Columbia have passed state statutes that prohibit employers from discriminating on the 
basis of sexual orientation.  HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE EMPLOYMENT LAWS AND POLICIES (2008), available at 
http://www.hrc.org/documents/Employment_Laws_and_Policies.pdf. 
213 See, e.g., H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). 
214 Gallup Poll, Question Id: USGALLUP .0331 Q19; see also 2004 L.A. Times Poll, Question Id: USLAT .041104 R52 (70 
percent favor . . . laws to protect gays against job discrimination); GLAAD Media Reference Guide, 
http://www.glaad.org/media/guide/infocus/polls.php (last visited Sept. 6, 2008) (Gallup poll in 2005 shows 87% support); John 
Newsome, On Protecting Gay Americans from Workplace Discrimination Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) Vote 
Tests Our Values, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 7, 2007, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2007/11/07/EDD7T6UMC.DTL (2006 Gallup poll shows 89% support). 
215 See, e.g.,  Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 3685 (Oct. 23, 2007), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/110-1/hr3685sap-r.pdf (policy position of former President George W. Bush). 
216 Letter from the GAO to the Honorable James M. Jeffords, Chairman, Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 
Sexual Orientation Based Employment Discrimination: States’ Experience with Statutory Prohibitions Since 1997 (Apr. 28, 
2000). 
217 Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Mark(et)ing NonDiscrimination: Privatizing ENDA with a Certification Mark, 104  
MICH. L. REV. 1639, 1645 (2006) (tbl. 1: Analysis of Litigation Rates and Expected Costs of State Prohibitions).  
218 Id.  
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whether the opponents’ objections are well founded. A randomized control trial could produce 
valuable information on whether ENDA decreases the profitability or the stock price of firms. 
We would learn about the litigation and compliance costs for a representative subsample of 
firms. And we could even find out if ENDA caused covered firms to lose market share to 
uncovered firms. 
In this subsection, we discuss how such a test might be structured. Although it would be 
theoretically possible to randomly assign the application of ENDA to individual workers, the 
administrative costs for an employer to comply with a discrimination prohibition on part of its 
workforce would not produce a very accurate view of firm-level costs of compliance. So 
randomizing across firms would probably be the most effective approach. Given the negligible 
costs implicit in the GAO data, the compliance costs are unlikely to be so great as to create a 
substantial competitive disadvantage. (By comparing relative market shares of the covered and 
uncovered firms, analysts can test for any impact on competition.) Firms assigned to the status 
quo control group (no prohibition of discrimination) might, however, be impacted by the 
treatment group, if employees transferred to or from the treatment group because of the 
discrimination prohibition.  If concern over this type of overflow effect is large enough, it might 
militate for randomizing at the industry level—or conducting a mixed experiment that partially 
randomizes at the industry and partially at the firm level.219  
It is also necessary to determine what proportion of firms would be assigned to comply 
with ENDA. There are so many firms in the United States—more than seven million businesses 
with employees220—that it would be possible to perform a powerful test that assigns perhaps 1% 
to the covered or uncovered arm of the experiment.  The test might initially run for three to five 
years, to give the firms and the employees time to learn about and adjust to the requirement. 
A more libertarian version of the test would merely assign different ENDA defaults to 
different firms. Federal law currently allows employers to intentionally discriminate on the basis 
of employee sexual orientation. But this employer freedom to discriminate is nothing more than 
a default. There is nothing to stop employers from opting into ENDA by private contract and 
giving their employees and applicants virtually identical rights, including private rights of action, 
                                                 
219 Alternatively, the possible overflow effects of employees could be dampened by randomizing across cities or states.  But the 
plausible size of this impact to our minds would not justify reducing the number of the number of observations. 
220 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS, tbl. 735, available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/tables/08s0735.pdf.  
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as they would have if ENDA passed. Indeed, Jennifer Brown and Ian Ayres have created a 
contractual mechanism where any employer with just a few clicks at 
www.fairemploymentmark.org can do just that.221 In this agreement, employers gain the right to 
use a certification mark if they promise not to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. The 
certification mark gives employers a private contract route to effectively opt in to the statute’s 
coverage. But Congress could take the fair employment idea further, by giving firms an explicit 
right to affirmatively “opt into” ENDA coverage.222  
The fight over civil rights legislation to date has exclusively sounded in terms of 
mandatory rules. But recent empirical research in behavioral economics suggests that defaults 
and menus matter, even at the firm-wide level.223 Instead of running an experiment on the effects 
of mandatory ENDA, it would be possible to test the impact of varying the default or menu 
dimensions of the law. Specifically, we could imagine randomizing firms into three groups: a 
control group with the status quo federal coverage; an “opt in” group of firms that could 
affirmatively opt for coverage by sending a notice to the Justice Department; and an “opt out” 
group of firms that could avoid liability under the statute by sending notice (in advance of any 
claimed discrimination) to the Justice Department that they did not wish to be covered.224 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Randomized experimentation offers a powerful means of evaluating the effects of 
proposed policies. By applying laws and policies to different groups on a random basis, the 
causal impacts of the law can be isolated from other factors that would ordinarily be correlated 
with exposure to different policies. It is therefore not surprising that randomized controlled 
experiments have become increasingly prevalent in evaluating the impacts of different laws and 
                                                 
221 The fair employment license falls short of ENDA protections in a few dimensions. See Ayres & Brown, supra note 217, at 
23 (noting that the license would not be enforced by governmental agencies and private suits could not be brought in federal 
court); Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Privatizing Employment Protection, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 587 (2007). 
222 Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2006). 
223 Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do? An Empirical Examination (Yale Law School, Working 
Paper No. 335, 2005).  
224 Randomized tests of default rules and menu options do pose particular problems for maintaining an uncontaminated control 
group similar to those described above.  It is possible that the control group’s behavior will be impacted by the treatment.  
Control group firms may be confused about the legal regime under which they are operating. Or the existence of the treatment 
group might by itself increase the salience of the issue and put pressure on control group firms to contract for substitutes for the 
treatment (such as the Fair Employment Mark).  The availability of close substitutes for the treatment can bias (toward zero) the 
estimated impacts of the treatment. James Heckman, Neil Hohnmann, Jeffrey Smith & Michael Khoo, Substitution and Dropout 
Bias in Social Experiments: A Study of an Influential Social Experiment, 115 Q. J. ECON. 651 (2000).  
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policies. The vast majority of policy changes, however, are enacted without the benefit of 
randomized evaluations. This Article seeks to systematize and expand the use of randomized 
experiments of law and policy. In the short term, a number of individual experiments could 
advance the cause of randomization and improve policy. In the long term, administrative 
agencies might be required to file randomization impact statements with all new regulations. 
Meanwhile, a norm in favor of experimental evidence could encourage legislators to back up 
their empirical claims with a willingness to initiate experiments through legislation, with policy 
outcomes dependent on experimental results. 
